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INTRODUCTION
will never forget the day in the summer of 1992 when I
stepped onto Red Square in Moscow for the first time. Just
months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, decades of
economic restrictions and consumer goods shortages were
clearly evident in the clothing and cars of the Muscovites
I
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around me. Oddly, directly across the square from the red stars
atop the Kremlin—the very symbols of Communism—stood an
enormous department store, Gosudarstvennyi Universal’nyi
Magazin (“State Universal Store” or “GUM”). The shops of
GUM also reflected decades of neglect of consumer culture, but
within a few short years, this would change on a vast scale. A
debt-fueled consumer explosion would bring to Russia both the
benefits and burdens of earlier market transformations in Eu-
rope: masses of goods that the average citizen could never have
imagined owning, but also masses of debt taken on to enjoy
those goods now and capitalize on hope for sustained if not im-
proved economic good fortune in the future.
This article examines the tumultuous transition from restric-
tive Communism to the debt-fueled consumer economy of mod-
ern Russia. In particular, it surveys Russia’s legal response to
severe debt distress, situating it in the context of nearly one
thousand years of historical development. Russia’s reactions to
personal debt and bankruptcy2 have always linked the country
firmly with European trends and traditions. In its latest move,
effective October 1, 2015, Russia has finally joined most of its
European neighbors in adopting a personal bankruptcy law,
with characteristics that reflect both evolving international
best practices and a series of lessons not learned. This article
offers the first detailed exposition in English of the two steps
forward represented by this new law, as well as an evaluation
of the one step back that will likely result when Russia experi-
ences the same challenges with personal insolvency procedures
that its neighbors have faced in recent years.
The analysis presented here contributes to a deeper under-
standing of modern Russian law and society by tracing the
striking emergence of a massive consumer debt problem only a
few years after the fall of Communism, along with the devel-
opment of a legal solution that is largely consistent with Euro-
pean norms but remains in many respects uniquely Russian. It
tells the story of how a people with lots of money but nothing to
2. Throughout this article, the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” will
be used more or less interchangeably to indicate the state of a debtor who is
unable to pay all of his or her debts when due. The two terms have technical
distinctions in certain contexts (and in certain countries more than in others),
but particularly in the Russian context, they are virtually synonymous. In-
deed, the name of the Russian law governing this topic is the Federal Law
“On Insolvency (Bankruptcy).” See infra note 142.
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buy soon transformed into a nation deluged by things to buy,
but also by an exponential growth of consumer debt to finance
those purchases.
Part I charts the rise of consumerism and consumer debt in
Russia, which began in earnest a mere fifteen years ago. Part
II lays out the current international perspective on best prac-
tices in legal procedures for treating overwhelming consumer
indebtedness. This topic has attracted significant attention in
recent decades from international organizations, most recently
in a voluminous and compelling report by the World Bank. Part
III examines the Russian response to this problem. It begins
with a one thousand-year retrospective on the often intriguing
variety of ways in which pre-Revolutionary Russian law re-
sponded to insolvency, continuing with a brief description of
the reemergence of commercial bankruptcy law in post-Soviet
Russia. Finally, this Part presents a detailed analysis of the
new procedure for personal insolvency, concluding with an
evaluation of several challenges this new system is likely to
face in light of experiences with analogous laws elsewhere in
Europe and the situation on the ground in Russia today. The
new Russian law is likely to be very influential as neighboring
countries consider developing their own personal insolvency
legislation. If neighboring legislatures can incorporate not only
the elegant and efficient procedure of the new Russian law, but
also the lessons Russian lawmakers did not learn from survey-
ing European experience, these countries will take a substan-
tial leap forward.
I. SOMETHING FROMNOTHING: THE EMERGENCE OF CONSUMER
DEBT ANDOVERINDEBTEDNESS IN POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA
The fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was both a
product and a cause of turbulent economic transformation.3
The new Russia entered another smutnoe vremia4 that would
challenge the survival skills of banks and consumers alike. In
3. See Iris van de Wiel, The Russian Crisis 1998 Economic Report,
RABOBANK (Sept. 16, 2013),
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/september/the-russian-
crisis-1998/.
4. For a discussion of this historical reference, see J.P. Sommerville, 351-
10:Russia and Poland, 1598-1613: The Time of Troubles (Smutnoe Vremia),
https://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/351/351-10.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2016).
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the following two years, ordinary consumers endured hyperin-
flation that destroyed savings, made acquiring basic life needs
a Herculean task, and undermined trust in the banking sys-
tem.5 Consumer borrowing and lending could not germinate,
much less thrive in this environment.6 And just as things ap-
peared to be stabilizing by the late 1990s, a combination of poor
government budget management, falling oil and other natural
resource prices, and a crisis of investor confidence in Asian
emerging markets led to a Russian sovereign debt default in
August 1998, a general banking system collapse, and a plunge
in the value of the ruble, ushering in another era of rampant
inflation and consequent social unease. 7 At the turn of the
twenty-first century, with a rebound in oil prices and demand
for domestic products (an ironic positive impact of a massively
devalued ruble), the Russian economy, real wages, and con-
sumer confidence finally turned the corner and began a nearly
decade-long period of robust growth.8
For the first time, Russia had at last developed an environ-
ment conducive to the development of a consumer credit mar-
ket. In Soviet times, rationing and shortages made consumer
credit superfluous.9 The problem from at least the 1960s until
into the 1990s was that goods were scarce, not that funds to
buy them were scarce.10 Consumers had money to buy things11;
5. See van de Wiel, supra note 3; Steve Campbell, Comment, Brother,
Can You Spare a Ruble? The Development of Bankruptcy Legislation in the
New Russia, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 383–86 (1994); ALYA GUSEVA, INTO THE
RED: THE BIRTH OF THE CREDIT CARD MARKET IN POSTCOMMUNIST RUSSIA 104
(2008).
6. See GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 45.
7. See van de Wiel, supra note 3; Gérard Beĺanger et al., Russian Federa-
tion: Recent Economic Developments 7, 10, 13, 18, 22–23 (IMF Staff Country
Report No. 99/100 1999),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/1999/cr99100.pdf; Asya S. Alexan-
drovich, Bankruptcy Law, An Economic Medicine: How Russia’s New Bank-
ruptcy Legislation Facilitated Recovery From the Nationwide Financial Crisis
of August 17, 1998, 34 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 95, 105–06 (2001).
8. See van de Wiel, supra note 3; Gérard Be ́langer & Leslie Lipschitz,
Russian Federation: 2001 Article IV Consultation and Post-Program Monitor-
ing Discussions—Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information No-
tice on the Executive Board Discussion 3–10 (IMF Country Report No. 02/74
2002), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2002/cr0274.pdf.
9. GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 47.
10. Id.
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that is, until the hyperinflation and bank crises of the early
and later 1990s wiped out most people’s savings and devalued
their incomes.
The supply side of this potential market was also quite unde-
veloped. The legions of new, private banks that sprung up in
Russia in the early 1990s had little experience in their newly
reborn industry, and many failed in the rollercoaster early
transition years.12 As Russia emerged from the economic detri-
tus of several bank crises, culminating in the August 1998 sov-
ereign default, private banks stepped up their efforts to find
new sources of profit not reliant on investments in government
bonds and other sources of state capital. 13 Thus began the
gradual process of building a consumer credit system from
scratch.
Banks began constructing a mass market for consumer credit
by acculturating consumers to using cards, either as a precur-
sor to or substitute for cash, in their financial dealings.14 Early
efforts at developing a market for plastic cards (at first, debit
cards with overdraft facilities) had been concentrated on only a
few thousand “elite” users, and limited “borrowing” on these
cards was usually secured by a sizable deposit of the user’s
funds held at the issuing bank.15 Banks remained hesitant to
expand into direct, mass marketing of cards due to a lack of
access to information on potential card users’ real incomes and
accurate (nonfraudulent) identity and contact information.16
Banks overcame these problems by initiating “salary pro-
jects” with hundreds of end users at a time by establishing re-
lationships with these end users’ large employer-companies.17
A bank would offer to free the employer-company from the tra-
ditional, cumbersome process of disseminating large amounts
of cash to long lines of (impatient) employees on pay day.18 In-
11. Some consumers did borrow to take advantage of unique opportunities
to acquire large-ticket items, but this borrowing occurred primarily, if not
exclusively, on an informal basis within circles of friends. Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 50–52, 55.
13. Id. at 53–55, 82, 85, 111–12.
14. Id. at 62, 85, 97.
15. Id. at 57–58, 60–61, 67–68.
16. Id. at 63, 69, 72, 95.
17. Id. at 83–84, 93–94 (noting that such card projects remain quite com-
mon for salary, pension, and other subsidy distribution).
18. Id. at 84, 90–91.
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stead, the bank would credit salary payments to accounts
opened at that bank for each employee (most likely without the
employees’ consent or desire19), and employees would access
these credits via plastic cards issued by the bank to each em-
ployee.20 Gradually, as individuals became more trusting of and
comfortable with banks, they began to use these cards to make
purchases at merchants who had joined the card network.21
As with the earlier “elite” programs, these cards were initial-
ly restricted-use debit cards, but after 2001, overdraft borrow-
ing facilities became a more common feature.22 Nonetheless,
despite an astronomic expansion of the volume of issued cards
and card transactions from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the
overwhelming majority of card usage consisted of cardholders’
withdrawing credits at an ATM and using their preferred
method—cash—to engage in commerce; the proportion of pur-
chases, and particularly credit purchases, using cards re-
mained quite low.23
The real driver of consumer credit in Russia began in 2000,
leveraging the immediate relationship between consumers, ris-
ing consumer confidence, and the things consumers increasing-
ly desired to enhance their brighter futures. As real incomes
rebounded following the crises of the late 1990s, decades of
pent-up consumer demand exploded onto a rapidly expanding
retail market.24 A mass of new consumer retail outlets rose to
meet these demands for retail therapy and status confirmation:
In 2001 alone, fourteen new shopping centers opened their
doors, and not long thereafter, IKEA opened a second shopping
19. Id. at 97.
20. Id. at 84, 90–91.
21. Id. at 91–93, 104 (noting that this solved another series of problems
related to cash scarcity and intercompany debt). By 2014, the share of pay-
ments made with cards rose to 21 percent, up from only 5 percent in 2009.
This trend is sure to rise as most retailers will be required as of 2015 to ac-
cept card payments and install point-of-sale card terminals. Financial Cards
and Payments in Russia, Executive Summary, EUROMONITOR INT’L (Nov.
2015), http://www.euromonitor.com/financial-cards-and-payments-in-
russia/report.
22. GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 94, 96, 105 (noting that outstanding balances
are usually required to be repaid within a month, secured by directly deposit-
ed wages).
23. Id. at 86, 100–03, 106–08 (noting that insufficient merchant ac-
ceptance inhibited the growth of using cards as payment devices).
24. Id. at 112.
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mall in the Moscow area, the MEGA-2, the largest and busiest
shopping mall in Eastern Europe.25 As noted by Alya Guseva in
her brilliant study of consumer credit in transition-era Russia,
“[c]onsumption appears to be one of the most obvious means of
social differentiation and status achievement available to a
growing number of wage earners in today’s Russia.”26
The process of keeping up with the Ivanovs proceeded at a fu-
rious pace. In 2009, the World Bank observed with some con-
cern that “[h]ousehold lending was largely unknown in 2000
but had reached RUB 1 trillion by the end of 2005 and RUB 4
trillion by the close of 2008,” accounting for over 20 percent of
banks’ total loan portfolios by 2006.27 This relentless march
upward continued, with total outstanding loan volume to indi-
viduals exceeding 5 trillion rubles in 2011, surpassing 7 trillion
in 2012, and vaulting over 10 trillion rubles by early 2014.28
While home mortgage debt is included in these figures, such
high-value loans represent a relatively small portion of total
outstanding personal debt, though the proportion of mortgage
debt has risen to nearly 30 percent in the past few years.29 Bor-
25. Id. at 114.
26. Id. at 113.
27. World Bank, Private & Fin. Sector Dev. Dep’t, 1 Russian Federation
Diagnostic Review of Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Key Find-
ings and Recommendations 11–12 (2009),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPPRVSECDEV/Resources
/RU_CPFL_Vol_I_draft_EN.pdf.
28. Cent. Bank of the Russian Fed’n, Housing (Mortgage) Loan Market in
Russia: Statistical Yearbook No. 1 (2005-2013), at 56 (2015),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/b_sector/stat/Stat_digest_mortgage_01_e.pdf;
Information on Household Lending Risks in 2014, CENT. BANK RUSS. FED’N
(Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/risk_14_e.htm&
pid=pdko_sub&sid=itm_45841.
29. See World Bank, supra note 27, at 11 (“[M]ost household loans in Rus-
sia are for consumption not related to housing.”); Cent. Bank of the Russian
Fed’n, Godovoi Otchyot Banka Rossii za 2014 God 23 (2015),
http://cbr.ru/publ/?PrtId=god (reporting 11.3 trillion rubles of credit to indi-
viduals, of which 3.5 trillion rubles is mortgage credit); Cent. Bank of the
Russian Fed’n, Analiticheskie Materialy o sostoyanii rynka ipotechnogo
zhilishchnogo kreditovaniya v 2014 godu 2 (2015),
http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/ipoteka/am_2014.pdf. For a detailed analysis of
the development and operation of the Russian mortgage market, see OLGA
MASHKINA ET AL., THE EMERGING MORTGAGE MARKET IN RUSSIA: AN OVERVIEW
WITH LOCAL AND FOREIGN PERSPECTIVES (2007),
http://epub.lib.aalto.fi/pdf/hseother/b82.pdf.
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rowing activity was (and remains) widespread: in 2004, 25 per-
cent of Russians took at least one consumer loan, rising to
nearly 40 percent in the following year.30
Banks supercharged this buying frenzy by targeting consum-
ers at the most opportune moment: at the point of sale. Not re-
lying on the slow uptake of credit cards, banks set up booths
with one or two representatives in retail outlets to extend “ex-
press loans”—approved while you wait!31 Some banks combined
the two loan products, extending express loans in the form of
instant-issue credit cards (again, approved at the point of sale
after a brief application process) or automatically offering cards
to customers who had recently paid off an express loan.32 The
leader of this onslaught of consumer credit grew to one of the
most profitable banks in Russia within just three years of its
founding, and by 2004, one of the most profitable banks in the
world.33
With such a meteoric rise in lending, inevitably defaults
would follow. In their aggressive pursuit of the new frontier of
consumer credit profit, banks had sacrificed careful underwrit-
ing and risk management.34 Banks extended trillions of rubles
of express loans on the basis of often unverified information
supplied by applicants, “preferring to worry about uncertainty
and developing screening techniques later.”35 Russian banks
had come a long way in a very short time period from the days
30. GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 109; see also Fear over Default as Personal
Bank Debt in Russia Doubles in Two Years, RT.COM (July 29, 2013, 1:23 PM),
http://on.rt.com/btgddt (citing a study estimating the number of retail bor-
rowers in Russia at 34 million, or 45 percent of the economically active popu-
lation, with some regions reaching 100 percent).
31. GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 115, 121.
32. Id. at 115–16.
33. Id.
34. See Stephan Barisitz, Credit Boom in Russia Despite Global Woes—
Driving Forces and Risks, in 26 OESTERREICHISCHENATIONALBANK, FINANCIAL
STABILITY REPORT 82, 90–91 (2013),
http://www.oenb.at/dms/oenb/Publikationen/Finanzmarkt/Financial-Stability-
Report/2013/Financial-Stability-Report-
26/chapters/fsr_26_report_special_topics3.pdf (noting the rapid expansion of
unsecured consumer credit in 2012–13 and opining that “one may doubt the
capacity of banks to reliably verify the quality of the numerous incoming
credit applications,” especially in light of cost-saving automation of the un-
derwriting process).
35. GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 121.
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of reticent issuance of debit cards only to their most trusted,
elite customers.
Very early in the expansion of the consumer credit market,
the growth rate of overdue loans outstripped the growth rate of
total outstanding credit to individuals. More than a decade lat-
er, that disquieting relationship continues. In 2003, total out-
standing credit to individuals more than doubled (111 percent
growth) to just under 300 billion rubles, with only 3.6 billion—
1.2 percent—overdue.36 The following year, total outstanding
credit to individuals doubled again (107 percent growth), but
the volume of defaulted loans grew even faster, 139 percent, to
8.6 billion rubles.37 The scissors continued to open in 2005, with
total loan volume growing 91 percent to exceed 1 trillion rubles,
but defaults growing 158 percent to just over 22 billion (almost
2 percent of total outstanding loans).38 The global financial cri-
sis led to a 10 percent step back in consumer lending in 2009,39
though now an even more troubling indicator began to draw
attention. During the course of 2009, the proportion of loans to
individuals more than ninety days overdue rose from 4.4 per-
cent to 9.0 percent, nearing 300 billion rubles.40
Renewed vigorous growth in lending volume pulled the per-
centage of long-overdue individual loans back to 4.6 percent by
the beginning of 2013, but the volume of such defaulted loans
continued its relentless march upward, growing more than 64
36. Selected Indicators of Credit Institutions Performance by Assets as of
31.12.03, CENT. BANK RUSS. FED’N (Mar. 9, 2004),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/4-1-
3_010104_e.htm&pid=pdko_sub&sid=opdkovo.
37. Selected Indicators of Credit Institutions Performance by Assets as of
31.12.04, CENT. BANK RUSS. FED’N (Mar. 24, 2005),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/4-1-
3_010105_e.htm&pid=pdko_sub&sid=opdkovo.
38. Selected Indicators of Credit Institutions Performance by Assets as of
31.12.05, CENT. BANK RUSS. FED’N (Mar. 16, 2006),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/4-1-
3_010106_e.htm&pid=pdko_sub&sid=opdkovo.
39. L.B. Lazarov et al., Problems of Development of Consumer Credit Mar-
ket, 10 FUNDAMENTAL RES. 2174, 2176 (2014),
http://www.rae.ru/fs/pdf/2014/12-10/36547.pdf.
40. Information about the Risks of Lending to Individuals in 2009, CENT.
BANK RUSS. FED’N (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/4-1-
3_010106_e.htm&pid=pdko_sub&sid=opdkovo.
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percent in 2013 to over 500 billion rubles.41 The Central Bank
had been observing these growing defaults with alarm for
years. In 2012, it warned of a growing “latent cumulative credit
risk . . . largely for the portfolio of point-of-sale lending,”42 and
in 2013, it imposed tighter loan-loss provision requirements on
banks, requiring them to double reserves to insulate their bal-
ance sheets from expected consumer default losses.43 And with
good reason: in June 2015, loans to individuals over ninety
days in default surged past 1 trillion rubles for the first time,
on total outstanding loans hovering around 10 trillion; that is,
a startling rate of default topping 10 percent.44
While bank commentators have frequently pointed out that
the aggregate debt exposure of consumers in Russia is quite
modest by comparison to other countries,45 the debt burden is
41. Information on Household Lending Risks in 2013, CENT. BANK RUSS.
FED’N (Jan. 4, 2014)
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/risk_13_e.htm&
pid=pdko_sub&sid=itm_45841.
42. Vladislav Fedotkin, Russians Late on Loans, But Credit Bubble Not
Bursting Yet, SPUTNIK INT’L (Jan. 21, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://sptnkne.ws/aGyt.
43. See id.; Barisitz, supra note 34, at 94; Courtney Weaver, Russia Sees
Surge in Consumer Credit, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:28 PM),
http://on.ft.com/X3BuvQ [hereinafter Weaver, Russia Sees Surge]; Courtney
Weaver, Russia Central Bank Warns on ‘High’ Household Indebtedness, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://on.ft.com/1aGZZ93 [hereinafter Weav-
er, Russia Central Bank Warns].
44. Information on Household Lending Risks in 2015, CENT. BANK RUSS.
FED’N (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.aspx?file=bank_system/risk_15_e.htm&
pid=pdko_sub&sid=itm_45841. The proportion of consumer credit accounts in
serious arrears rose even further, to 14.2 percent, as of April 2015, marking a
new all-time low in consumer credit performance. Russians’ Credit Perfor-
mance Is Worst in Seven Years, According to Data from FICO and NBKI,
PRNEWSWIRE (May 26, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/russians-credit-performance-is-worst-in-seven-years-according-to-
data-from-fico-and-nbki-300087157.html.
45. See, e.g., Maria Levitov, Russian Debt Collectors Put On a New Face,
MOSCOW TIMES (May 24, 2005),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-debt-collectors-put-
on-a-new-face/223088.html (quoting Alexander Khandruyev, head of Banking
and Finance Investment and first vice president of the Russian Association of
Regional Banks, stating that consumer loans in Russia amounted to less than
2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), as contrasted with 72 percent in
the United States and 51 percent in Western Europe); Weaver, Russia Sees
Surge, supra note 43 (quoting Oliver Hughes, president of consumer lender
Tinkoff Credit Systems, saying “Russian consumers are underleveraged, they
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not evenly distributed and weighs more heavily on some. A
growing subset of borrowers engaged the market with particu-
lar gusto, taking on three, four, and even more loans.46 In addi-
tion to these vulnerable borrowers, commentators identified
segments of the population as more likely to encounter finan-
cial distress, such as young families.47 More than the objective
debt volume, the debt service burden affects consumer borrower
vulnerability more directly; that is, the proportion of income
needed to service principal and interest charges. A study of
Russian consumer indebtedness factors from 2009–2013 dis-
covered that, in light of high interest rates on consumer loans,
the debt service burden impacts households in Russia particu-
larly substantially.48 Nearly one-third of Russian households
dedicated 50 percent of their household income to debt service
in 2012 (more than double the percentage of such households in
the United States).49 More than 40 percent of households sur-
veyed reported that their income fell below the subsistence lev-
el after making their loan payments.50 In an economy so de-
pendent on oil revenues, a downturn in world oil prices and a
consequent, even relatively modest, rise in consumer goods
prices or unemployment could quickly send many Russian fam-
ilies into a financial tailspin. The effects of a downturn in oil
are good players,” and quoting Herman Gref, chairman of the state savings
bank, Sberbank, saying “I am not concerned about any bubble. If you com-
pare the level of household debt in Russia with that of mature markets, the
conclusion is that everything is under control.”); Iuliya Krivoshapko, Komu
dolzhny – prostili, ROSSIISSKAYA GAZETA (July 26, 2013, 12:40 AM),
http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/26/bankrotstvo.html (quoting Oleg Ivanov, Vice
President of the Association of Regional Banks, as noting that the personal
debt burden in Russia was only 10 percent of GDP, as opposed to 50 percent
in Germany when that country’s personal bankruptcy law was adopted).
46. See Weaver, Russia Central Bank Warns, supra note 43 (“[T]he num-
ber of borrowers with four or more consumer loans had nearly doubled in the
first nine months of 2013 . . . .”); Barisitz, supra note 34, at 91 (“[N]o less
than 30% of Russian household borrowers have reportedly taken out three or
more loans.”).
47. See Barisitz, supra note 34, at 91. (“[T]here is certainly a group of
households particularly vulnerable to overindebtedness, namely younger
people and families with high material needs and yet little financial experi-
ence.”).
48. Maria Denisova, One-Third of Russians Use Half Their Salary to Pay
Off Debt, OPEN ECON. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://opec.ru/en/1675908.html.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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prices combined with Western sanctions resulting from Rus-
sia’s actions in Ukraine will surely challenge many households’
finances in the years to come.51 Household perceptions of future
financial perspectives had turned quite sour even before a sig-
nificant downturn in oil prices and currency values and a sig-
nificant, inflation-driven income erosion in 2015.52
Ironically, a recent contraction of consumer lending may push
many borrowers over the edge. As Bob Lawless has demon-
strated empirically, a run-up in consumer credit lays the foun-
dation for a rise in financial distress, and a contraction of
available consumer credit leaves overindebted consumers with
no “bridge” option other than bankruptcy.53 Major consumer
lenders in Russia have finally begun to observe the ill effects of
rising defaults on their own bottom lines. As a result, they have
ramped up screening of applicants and reduced the flow of
available credit.54 Where will overindebted consumers turn?
Before October 1, 2015, bankruptcy was not an option for
Russian consumers drowning in debt. With the introduction of
a new personal bankruptcy law, Russian consumers now have
such an outlet. The following Part explores the recommended
characteristics of successful regimes.
51. See The Russian Economy: The End of the Line, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22,
2014), http://www.economist.com/node/21633816.
52. See CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INST., EMERGING CONSUMER SURVEY 2015,
at 72 (2015), https://publications.credit-
suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=B3C291F3-CA79-7495-
C6DE6C8F8954435F; Neil MacFarquhar, Russian Belts Tighten, Affecting
Tastes for the Finer Things, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2015,
http://nyti.ms/1J3GENW (noting an oil-price crash, economic sanctions over
Russia’s activities in Ukraine, devaluation of the ruble, a sharp rise in infla-
tion, and shrinking real wages for the first time in years).
53. Robert M. Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer Credit, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 347, 349–54, 362–71 (2007).
54. See Cent. Bank of the Russian Fed’n, Obzor Fiansovoi Stabil’nosti 42–
43 (Apr. 1, 2015), http://cbr.ru/publ/?PrtId=stability (noting a 4.5 percent con-
traction in outstanding unsecured consumer credit in the first quarter of
2015, more demanding lending policy by key banks, and an expected peak
arrears proportion by year-end 2015 of 17 percent); Oksana Kobzeva & Alex-
ander Winning, Russia’s Consumer Credit Market Grinding to a Halt – Home
Credit Bank,REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 5:22 AM), http://reut.rs/1ulWYHh.
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II. MODERN INTERNATIONALNORMS FOR TREATING THE ILLS OF
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
Russia is not the first European nation to struggle with the
problems of widespread overindebtedness among its citizens.
From Denmark in 198455 to Italy and Ireland in 2012,56 the
great majority of countries in Europe have responded to this
problem, as Russia now has, by adopting a legal regime for
treating the ills of personal (consumer) overindebtedness. 57
Over the past thirty years, European organizations and author-
ities have been diligent in monitoring the operations of these
new regimes and offering suggestions for approaches that work
well and not so well.58 While there is no universally recognized
set of “best practices” for personal insolvency systems,59 wide
agreement on a core set of preferred characteristics can be
identified from various reports and recommendations, includ-
ing most recently the World Bank’s Report on the Treatment of
the Insolvency of Natural Persons. 60 The three most salient
55. See Jason J. Kilborn, Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in
Continental Europe: Internalizing Negative Externalities and Humanizing
Justice in Denmark, 18 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 155, 166 (2009).
56. See Jason J. Kilborn, Reflections of the World Bank’s Report on the
Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons in the Newest Consumer
Bankruptcy Laws: Colombia, Italy, Ireland, 27 PACE INT’L L. REV. 316, 341
(2015).
57. See JASON J. KILBORN, EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION
OF EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE TREATMENT OF OVERINDEBTEDNESS,
1984–2010, at 18–21 (2011).
58. For a survey of prominent recommendations, see id. at 2–17; LONDON
ECON., STUDY ON MEANS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS IN FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY:
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY, DATIO IN SOLUTUM OF MORTGAGES, AND RESTRICTIONS
ON DEBT COLLECTION ABUSIVE PRACTICES 187–89 (2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/finservices-
retail/docs/fsug/papers/debt_solutions_report_en.pdf. (study commissioned by
the European Commission’s Internal Markets Directorate General, contract
no. MARKT/2011/023/B2/ST/FC).
59. See, e.g., Yan Liu & Christoph B. Rosenberg, International Monetary
Fund, Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the European Finan-
cial Crisis: A Review of the Economics and Legal Toolbox 14 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 13/44, Feb. 2013),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1344.pdf (noting that, de-
spite an urgent need, “there is no established international best practice at
all in this area [of household debt restructuring]”).
60. See, e.g., World Bank, Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task
Force, Report of the Working Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of
Natural Persons (2013), www-
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characteristics, and several notable subelements within them,
are as follows:
A. Discharge With Few Exceptions
The sine qua non of an effective, modern personal insolvency
system is to reduce the debt burden on overindebted individu-
als to return them to healthy social and economic inclusion.
This can seldom be accomplished on a voluntary, negotiated
basis with creditors, so the all but universally acknowledged
first principle of a personal insolvency regime is a mandated
legal discharge of at least some portion of the individual debt-
or’s unsustainable debt.61 This approach to debt relief is a dis-
tinct departure from a long history in virtually every country of
favoring creditors and preserving their rights at all costs. Mod-
ern personal insolvency laws, however, are built around broad-
er and more sensitive goals and objectives that expand the per-
spective well beyond largely illusory benefits to creditors, em-
phasizing instead the broad range of benefits for debtors, their
families, and especially broader society.62 Exceptions to this
discharge should be narrow, but some are generally accepted,
especially maintenance obligations to children, fines and penal-
ties, and debts incurred as a result of fraud.63
B. Access: Objectively Controlled Yet Open, Non-stigmatizing,
Low-Cost
A particular challenge here is striking a balance between en-
ticing the sick to seek treatment while keeping out the healthy.
On the one hand, the norm in personal insolvency law should
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/02
/000333037_20130502131241/Rend
ered/PDF/771700WP0WB0In00Box377289B00PUBLIC0.pdf. While the au-
thor was the chairperson of the drafting committee that created this report,
the views he expressed in this article are his own and do not necessary reflect
those of the committee, the Working Group, the Task Force, or the World
Bank.
61. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 18–21; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶
354; LONDONECON., supra note 58, at 190, 194.
62. These benefits are discussed in depth in World Bank, supra note 60, §
I.8, ¶¶ 56–111 (discussing the benefits in depth).
63. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 21–23; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
367–71 (also noting an exception for culpable conduct resulting in tort liabil-
ity for personal injury); LONDON ECON., supra note 58, at 197.
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be making reasonable sacrifices and paying one’s debts; dis-
charge relief should be reserved for cases of serious distress.
Identifying the dividing line distinguishing “can’t pay” debtors
from those who can but would rather not pay should be done in
a sensitive, maximally objective manner. While debt relief
should not be an unrestricted and automatic right, “over-
indebted” or “insolvent” debtors (defined as objectively as pos-
sible, in terms of their inability to satisfy their debts as they
come due within a reasonably foreseeable period) should be
granted access without a probing examination of the subjective-
ly identified causes of their financial predicament or “good
faith.”64
On the other hand, more problematic than deterring oppor-
tunistic, healthy debtors is enticing sufficient numbers of truly
distressed debtors to seek treatment.65 The type of portfolio re-
lief provided by a personal insolvency system must be made
available to an optimally wide range of distressed debtors if the
macroeconomic benefits of such a system are to be obtained.66
The medicine of a discharge is designed to deal with a pandem-
ic of overindebtedness, and it can meet this goal effectively only
if relief is dispensed on an appropriately expansive basis.
Relief should be available to those who need it through a neu-
tral, non-cost-prohibitive entry portal, and in a nonpunitive
procedure to avoid dissuading eligible, honest but unfortunate
debtors. The stigmatizing label “bankrupt” is a powerful deter-
rent to debtors’ seeking necessary relief, and elements of a
debt-relief system that accentuate this stigma or exacerbate it
should be avoided.67 For example, restrictions on the activities
of debtors during or after a relief proceeding have been and
should be minimized.68
It is axiomatic that in a system designed to treat debtors’
shortfalls of funds to cover debt, access to treatment should not
be hindered by those very same funding shortages.69 Cost effi-
ciency can be achieved only if the system is administered effi-
64. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 40, 43–45; World Bank, supra note 60,
¶¶ 193–97; LONDON ECON., supra note 58, at 192–94.
65. SeeWorld Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 120–22.
66. See id., ¶¶ 56–111, 115, 119–20, 124.
67. See LONDON ECON., supra note 58, at 194.
68. SeeWorld Bank, supra note 60, ¶ 123.
69. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 33, 35; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
183–85.
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ciently, avoiding burdensome administrative technicalities ap-
propriate for high-value business insolvencies, but inappropri-
ate for low-value personal bankruptcies.70 Abandoning uncon-
structive and unnecessary procedural formalities has been a
key focus in several stages of revisions to other European per-
sonal insolvency regimes.71 In particular, while the participa-
tion of creditors and committees is common and sensible in
business bankruptcy cases, creditors’ participation in adminis-
tering personal bankruptcy cases should be minimized or ex-
cluded—creditors’ rights are protected by objective elements of
the regime, not by their control over the process.72
Likewise, the intervention of courts in what tend to be simple
and routinized personal bankruptcy cases introduces unneces-
sary burden and expense; a simpler administrative model is
generally preferred in Europe, so long as access to a court sys-
tem is available for parties who feel their due process rights
have been violated by the administrator.73 This preference has
often been expressed by requiring debtors to seek informal, out-
of-court solutions to their debt problems before engaging a for-
mal administrative or court-based process, though the delays
and disappointing results of such requirements have led to
their abandonment in recent years.74 In cases where some de-
gree of negotiation with creditors is permitted or required, low-
cost, professional counseling assistance for debtors is crucial to
the success of such negotiations.75 Further, some administra-
tor-imposed or court-imposed “cram-down” mechanism for
overcoming the (irrational) resistance of a minority of creditors
should be available.76
70. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 33; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 206–
08.
71. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 36–39.
72. SeeWorld Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 206–15.
73. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 23–24; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
154–66; LONDON ECON., supra note 58, at 195–97.
74. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 25–28; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
128–34.
75. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 24–25; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
135–37.
76. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 28–33; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶
138; LONDONECON., supra note 58, at 196–97.
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C. Earned Start: Asset Liquidation and Payment Plans
Proper balance between the interests of creditors and debtors
requires that creditors receive the benefit of their legitimate
bargains, to the extent possible, by receiving a distribution of
whatever value debtors reasonably can make available. Histor-
ically, and still today in Anglo-American consumer bankruptcy
regimes, the principal method of expropriating value from
debtors is the traditional one: appointing a trustee to liquidate
the debtor’s property (with the exception of protected categories
of subsistence-supporting assets) and distribute that value (if
any) to creditors.77 Most overindebted individuals have few if
any “non-exempt” assets of any value, however.78 Though the
range of categories of “exempt” property was historically quite
constricted, there has been a notable expansion of these prop-
erty protections in many states in recent decades, making it
even less likely that the average debtor will have any asset
value available for distribution to creditors.79 Protections for
the family home have been particularly controversial, some-
times allowing debtors to shield significant value from their
creditors.80 However, for homes encumbered by mortgages, leg-
islatures around the world have shown a fairly consistent un-
willingness to interfere with secured creditor rights.81
The primary source of value for most individuals is not cur-
rent assets, but future earning capacity; that is, anticipated
salary, wages, and other labor earnings. As a result, a crucial
aspect of a proper debtor-creditor balance in European personal
insolvency systems is an almost universal demand that debtors
earn their fresh start by not only surrendering their nonexempt
assets, but also subjecting themselves to a multiyear rehabili-
tation plan and endeavoring to make some amount of install-
ment payment from future earnings to creditors.82 Here again,
given many debtors’ strained personal expense-and-income
structure, and the depressed economic factors (especially un-
employment) that lead to most personal bankruptcies, even
payment plans have produced surprisingly little value for cred-
77. SeeWorld Bank, supra note 60, ¶ 220.
78. Id. ¶ 221.
79. Id. ¶ 227.
80. Id.¶ 241.
81. Id., ¶¶ 319–22, 326–27, 344–49.
82. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 45; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 262,
310, 356; LONDON ECON., supra note 58, at 196.
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itors.83 The labor-intensive process of formulating and imposing
payment plans on all debtors has therefore been criticized in
recent years and remains somewhat controversial.84
Where payment plans are required, the terms of their formu-
lation implicate sensitive policy issues. First, most modern per-
sonal insolvency regimes resist relegating the decision as to
debt relief to majority creditor vote. The proper measure of ex-
pected sacrifice by debtors and creditors alike is a public policy
issue that should be decided by a legislature and imposed by an
administrator or court, not voted on by private creditors.85 Sec-
ond, uniform multiyear payment plans require a careful deter-
mination of the level of sacrifice expected of debtors and their
families. Such plans should not extend beyond a moderate pe-
riod (most often three to five years) and should not extract so
much of the debtor’s family income as to jeopardize their digni-
fied existence.86 The terms of such plans should apply uniform-
ly to debtors within discrete categories of income level and fam-
ily size. Leaving plan length or budget determination to admin-
istrative or judicial discretion has led inevitably to unrealistic
and unworkable expectations of debtors, as well as wide dispar-
ities in treatment of similarly situated debtors based on noth-
ing more than geography or idiosyncratic personal preference
of the particular decision maker.87
III. HISTORY ANDDEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
LAW IN RUSSIA
Over nearly one thousand years, Russian law has evolved
through several distinct stages in its attitude toward insolvent
debtors. Seeing the continuum is useful to understanding any
given point along it; therefore, this Part surveys the deep histo-
ry of Russian personal bankruptcy law. Pre-Revolutionary de-
velopments situate Russia squarely within a broader European
83. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 46–47; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
298–301, 313.
84. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 45, 48; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
311–15.
85. World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 284–90; LONDON ECON., supra note 58,
at 196.
86. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 49-58; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶
262–65, 274.
87. See World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 266–68, 284–88, 294; LONDON
ECON., supra note 58, at 192–93, 197.
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tradition of harsh attitudes toward defaulting debtors, as do
post-Soviet movements toward rehabilitating debtors in the
interests of macroeconomic societal health and well-being. The
culmination of this process, in the adoption of the new personal
bankruptcy law, is presented in this Part as well.
A. The Rise and Fall of Bankruptcy Law in Old Russia
Russia has a long and colorful history of laws dealing with
defaulting debtors. The oldest surviving law code from ancient
Rus’, the Russkaya Pravda, 88 assigns monetary penalties to
various crimes and infractions, to transition away from vendet-
tas and blood feuds.89 The oldest portion of this ancient law
code, dating to 1019–1054 CE, begins with a listing of various
crimes, ranging from murder to various forms of battery with
various instruments and resulting injuries, and then moves to
property crimes, including concealing a runaway slave and un-
authorized use or theft of someone else’s horse.90 In this con-
text, the fourteenth or fifteenth article91 addresses defaulting
debtors:
If somewhere someone seeks from another person the balance
[of money owed him], but that person begins to resist, then he
is to appear at an investigation before twelve men; and if he
wrongfully did not give [the money] back, then he is [to re-
turn] the money [to its rightful owner], and [pay] three griv-
nas for the offense.92
How much was the monetary fine of three grivna worth? This
was also the penalty for cutting off someone’s finger, concealing
someone’s runaway slave, and riding someone’s horse without
88. See Lev Pushkarev & Natalia Pushkareva, Russkaya Pravda,
ENTSYKLOPEDIYA KRUGOSVET,
http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/istoriya/russkaya_pravda.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2016).
89. See DANIEL H. KAISER, THE LAWS OF THE RUS – TENTH TO FIFTEENTH
CENTURIES 15–19 (1992). This is a similar transition to the one observed in
tribal laws throughout northern and western Europe in the late first millen-
nium. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 52–55 (1983).
90. Pushkarev & Pushkareva, supra note 88; KAISER, supra note 89, at 15–
19.
91. The original was not broken into articles, so various modern versions
of the Russkaya Pravda are numbered differently.
92. KAISER, supra note 89, at 16, art. 14.
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permission or stealing a horse, weapons, or clothing.93 It is not
clear how “wrongful” nonpayment was distinguished from “in-
nocent” nonpayment.
Following a general trend in Europe in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries,94 these monetary fines were replaced by a
system of corporal punishment or coercion, in the case of debt
enforcement called pravyozh. 95 Debtors whose defaults had
been confirmed by judgment would be lined up daily (except for
holidays) behind several bailiffs, who would proceed to hit the
debtors on the calves with a stick for several hours until the
judge emerged from the court.96 In the mid-1500s, Ivan IV (the
Terrible) imposed limits on the total term of the pravyozh pro-
cess: one month for a debt of 100 rubles, and proportionally
more or less time for larger or smaller debts.97 This practice is
reflected in the earliest monument of printed Russian Imperial
law, the Ulozhenie of 1649.98 Debtors whose insolvency was the
result of force majeure, such as fire, cattle drowning, or theft,
were to be given a forbearance of one to three years,99 but after
this time, nobles and their children were subject to pravyozh,
followed by confiscation of land, serfs, and property to be ap-
plied to pay off their debts.100 It could be worse: lower-level no-
bles with no property to pay off their debts were to be turned
over to their creditors at the conclusion of the pravyozh process,
and non-noble debtors were to be turned over immediately, as
serfs to work off their debts101 at a statutory rate of 5 rubles per
93. See KAISER, supra note 89, at 16, arts. 7, 11–13.
94. See BERMAN, supra note 89, at 55.
95. See generally Pravezh, GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (A.M. Prokhorov
ed., 3d ed. 1970); Pravezh, 49 BROCKHAUS AND EFRON ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY (1890–1907).
96. See Pravezh, supra note 95. The practice is memorialized in a Russian
proverb, v nogax pravdy net (“[T]here is no truth in legs”). Sergey Armeyskov,
#Russian Saying: There Is No Truth in Legs, RUSSIAN UNIVERSE BLOG (Dec.
16, 2013), http://russianuniverse.org/2013/12/16/russian-saying/.
97. Armeyskov, supra note 96.
98. Ulozhenie [Code] POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII
[PSZ][Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire], v. I, 1649, No. 1,
ch. X, arts. 204, 261, http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php.
99. See id. ch. X, art. 203.
100. Id. ch. X, arts. 204, 261–63 (allowing for a one-month reprieve from
pravyozh, but not more); id. ch. X, art. 269 (calling for the sale of the stands
and shops of merchant debtors).
101. The practice of debt slavery dates back to at least the Sudebniki of
1497 and 1550, both of which provided that a merchant who borrowed and
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year for men, half that for women, and 2 rubles per year for the
debtor’s children older than ten (children younger than ten
were not pressed into indentured servitude).
In 1718, Peter I (the Great) put an end to pravyozh, though
indentured servitude continued.102 To advance his program of
naval development, male bankrupts were sent from throughout
the Empire to the new capital, St. Petersburg, and conscripted
into the navy, with suitable ones assigned to work on the ships,
while women were sent to a St. Petersburg “spinning house” to
make linens, and the elderly and minors were assigned to other
work.103 Debtors were fed the same way as prisoners, and for
their work, they were credited one ruble per month (a signifi-
cant raise over the earlier 5 rubles per year, now equal for men
and women) until their debts were paid off.104
The official attitude toward debtors reached its nadir in De-
cember 1740 with the announcement of the first of many laws
called “Charter on Bankrupts.”105 This first charter expressed
heartfelt concern for subjects who had been cast into ruin by
bankrupts’ failing to pay their debts, and it therefore estab-
lished the first discrete system for dealing with such failures.106
lost money or goods and could not repay would be offered an installment plan
(without interest) if the loss were no fault of his own, but if the merchant lost
the value given by drinking or “some other foolishness” or simply “in the ab-
sence of circumstances beyond the control of man,” he would be handed over
to the creditor as a debt slave “to make up the loss.” See HORACEW. DEWEY,
MUSCOVITE JUDICIAL TEXTS: 1488–1556, at 19, 71 (1966) (translating article
55 of the Sudebnik of 1497 and article 90 of the Sudebnik of 1550). Statutory
serfdom paid men 5 rubles per year, women half that, and children older than
ten 2 rubles. Ulozhenie [Code], supra note 98, ch. X, arts. 204, 206, 266; id.
ch. XX, arts. 39–40. Children younger than ten were not pressed into inden-
tured servitude. Id.
102. See Zakon o posylke prestupnikov muzheska pola na galery, a
zhenshchin na priadil’nyi dvor, dlya zarabotki sostoyashchix na nix kazennyx
nedoimok i chastnyx dolgov i vzyskanii [Law on Sending Male Criminals to
the Galleys, and Women to the Spinning House, for Working Off State Debts
Held by Them, as well as Private Debts and Demands] POLNOE SOBRANIE
ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Collection of Laws of the Rus-
sian Empire], v. V, 1718, No. 3140, http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ustav o bankrotax [Charter on Bankrupts], POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV
ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Em-
pire], v. XI, 1740, No. 8300, http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php.
106. See id. (introductory paragraph).
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Debtors who had fallen on hard times through no fault of their
own (e.g., through unforeseeable and unavoidable fire, theft,
foreign invasion, or another’s bankruptcy), were to be spared
public sanction but held under arrest until their assets were
sold and distributed.107 Debtors whose distress was caused by
their own fault (including carelessness and continuing to trade
with insufficient capital), however, were to be subject to “the
heaviest punishment”; that is, death by hanging “as an exam-
ple to others.”108 Luckily for debtors, this law apparently never
received formal status as a law and therefore had very little
influence.109
The first “Charter on Bankrupts” to officially become law and
enjoy wide application was adopted in 1800.110 This law for the
first time drew a formal distinction between the bankruptcies
of merchants111 and nonmerchants (nobles and higher and low-
er aristocrats by birth or civil service).112 The law further dis-
tinguished three types of bankruptcy: accidental, negligent,
and malicious.113 Accidental bankrupts were designated by a
special, non-judgmental term, upadshii (fallen), while the oth-
ers were called “bankrupts.”114
While the fate of insolvent merchants was left to a vote of
creditors,115 nonmerchant cases were administered by a court.116
107. Id. arts. 1–21.
108. Id. arts. 1–3, 31–36.
109. See M.V. Teliukina, O nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve), in KOMMENTARII
K FEDERAL’NOMU ZAKONU (Iu P. Orlovskii ed., 1998); Irina Aleksandrovna
Shcherbovich, K voprosu ob istochnikax regulirovaniya konkursnogo protsessa
v Rossii v XIX veke [, BULL. ADYGEYA STATE UNIVERSITY 2 (2007),
http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/k-voprosu-ob-istochnikah-regulirovaniya-
konkursnogo-protsessa-v-rossii-v-xix-veke.pdf.
110. Ustav o bankrotax [Charter on Bankrupts], POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV
ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Em-
pire], v. XXVI, 1800, No. 19692, http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php; see
also Teliukina, supra note 109 (noting the wide application of the 1800 law).
111. See id. pt. I, arts. 1–171.
112. See id. pt. II, arts. 87–111.
113. See id. pt. I, arts. 130, 132, 135, 138.
114. See id. pt. I, art. 131.
115. See id. pt. I, arts. 132, 133, 136, 139 (determining category of debtor by
majority vote of creditors by number and volume of debt, discharging––or
wiping out––deficiency for faultless merchant debtors, though not for others,
and punishing malicious merchant bankrupts as public thieves). For a fasci-
nating exploration of merchant bankruptcy cases in nineteenth century Rus-
sia, see the magnificent dissertation by Sergei Antonov, Law and the Culture
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If a debt deficiency remained after liquidation of the debtor’s
available assets, the 1800 Charter put an end to indentured
servitude, leaving the debtor’s fate instead to the court’s evalu-
ation of the debtor’s written evidence of the circumstances lead-
ing to the insolvency117: In what must have been the extraordi-
narily rare event that the debtor qualified as an upadshii (ac-
cidental debtor) by convincing the court that insolvency had
been caused by fire, flood, theft, foreign invasion, or “other un-
fortunate circumstances that [the debtor] could neither foresee
nor avoid,” such a debtor was subject to no further punishment
or debt enforcement.118 This may be the first (theoretical) non-
merchant, court-ordered bankruptcy discharge in modern his-
tory.119
Judging by accounts of merchant bankruptcies, it seems to
have been the rare exception that a bankruptcy was estab-
lished as “accidental.”120 A list of debtors imprisoned in Moscow
in the 1820s included five individuals who had borrowed sever-
al hundred rubles to finance their daughters’ weddings, several
ruined by illness, and a man who had borrowed 3000 rubles to
ransom himself from serfdom.121 These people, and similar
honest but unfortunate debtors, would be branded negligent
“bankrupts” and relegated to a term of imprisonment for five
years (so long as creditors were willing to pay 50–150 rubles
per year for the debtor’s maintenance).122 The debtor could se-
cure early release by paying off the debt with an inheritance or
of Debt in Moscow on the Eve of the Great Reforms, 1850–1870 (2011) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with Columbia
University Academic Commons),
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A132251.
116. See Charter on Bankrupts, supra note 110, pt. II, art. 98.
117. See id.
118. See id. pt. II, art. 99.
119. See Jason Kilborn, Bankruptcy in Russia, 1740-1800, and the First
Non-Merchant Discharge!, CREDIT SLIPS BLOG (July 23, 2015, 11:51 AM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/07/bankruptcy-in-russia-1740-to-
1800-from-death-to-discharge.html.
120. See Antonov, supra note 115, at 117.
121. Id. at 119–20.
122. See Ustav o bankrotax [Charter on Bankrupts], supra note 110, pt. II,
art. 100. It was quite common that creditors were unwilling to pay for the
debtor’s maintenance in jail, so insolvent debtors often escaped imprisonment
this way. See Antonov, supra note 115, at 232.
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other income.123 Good-hearted creditors could also vote to re-
duce the term of imprisonment proportionally—for instance, a
vote of one-fifth of the creditors by volume of unpaid debt
would reduce the term by one year, two-fifths by two years, and
so on.124
These general contours of personal bankruptcy law persisted
largely unchanged until the 1917 Revolution. The separation of
merchant and nonmerchant bankruptcies was later formalized,
as new commercial courts administered merchant bankruptcies
pursuant to rules in the Code of Commercial Procedure,125
while ordinary courts administered nonmerchant insolvency
with a few specific alternate and supplemental rules in the
Code of Civil Procedure.126 Imprisonment of insolvent debtors
continued to be the end result of these procedures,127 with
123. See Ustav o bankrotax [Charter on Bankrupts], supra note 110, pt. II,
art. 102.
124. See id. pt. II, art. 106. Debtors were also commonly freed by operation
of periodic celebratory amnesties and creditor agreements after charitable
committees paid off part of their debts. See Antonov, supra note 115, at 233–
35, 256–67.
125. See Ustav sudoproizvodstva torgovago [Code of Commercial Procedure]
SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [SV] [Digest of Laws of the Russian Em-
pire], v. XI, pt. II, arts. 384–534,
http://civil.consultant.ru/reprint/books/253/1.html; see also Uchrezhdenie
Kommercheskix Sudov, i Ustav ix sudoproizvodstva [Establishment of Com-
mercial Courts, and Code of their Procedure] POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV
ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Em-
pire], v. VII, 1832, No. 5360, art. 31, http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php;
Ustav o torgovoi nesostoyatel’nosti [Code of Commercial Insolvency] POLNOE
SOBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Collection of Laws of
the Russian Empire], v. VII, 1832, No. 5463, http://www.nlr.ru/e-
res/law_r/coll.php.
126. See Ustav grazhdanskago sudoproizvodstva [Code of Civil Procedure]
SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [SZ] [Digest of Laws of the Russian Em-
pire], v. XVI, pt. I, art 1400, app. III,
http://civil.consultant.ru/reprint/books/238/309.html#img310; Po proektu
vremennyx pravil o poryadke proizvodstva del o nesostoyatel’nosti v
sudebnyx ustanovleniyax, obrazovannyx po Uchrezhdeniyu 20 Noyabrya
1864 goda [On the Project of Temporary Rules of Procedure for Insolvency
Cases in Judicial Structures Formed by the Establishment of 20 November
1864] POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Collec-
tion of Laws of the Russian Empire], v. XXXXIII, 1868, No. 46067,
http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php.
127. Even after imprisonment as a debt enforcement method was abolished
in 1879, it remained valid in insolvency cases. See Ob otmene lichnago za-
derzhaniya, kak sposoba vzyskaniya s neispravnyx dolzhnikov [On the Aboli-
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nonmerchants regaining their freedom after a prison term of
six months to five years,128 or by creditor agreement (or creditor
failure to advance the established costs of at least one month’s
food provisions for the imprisoned debtor).129
Like other European statutes of the time, these bankruptcy
provisions were concerned all but exclusively with satisfaction
of creditors and coercing as much payment as possible from re-
calcitrant debtors. While relief for debtors from overwhelming
debt was a concept that would arise only much later in Europe,
the turn-of-the-century Russian law contained one ray of hope:
once a debtor had served the prison term for unpaid debt, the
debtor could no longer be imprisoned for nonpayment of that
debt.130 No concept of discharge existed, however, so the unpaid
debt could still be enforced against the debtor’s future property.
B. Insolvency Law in Modern Russia and the Long Wait for
“Citizen” Bankruptcy
The Revolution put an end to market capitalism and any no-
tion of a need for bankruptcy legislation for individuals from
November 1917 to the fall of the Soviet Union in December
1991.131 Almost immediately thereafter, bankruptcy law was
among the very first orders of business in the new Russian
Federation. In June 1992, President Yeltsin issued an interim
tion of Personal Detention as a Means of Enforcement against Incorrigible
Debtors] POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERII [PSZ] [Complete Col-
lection of Laws of the Russian Empire], v. XXXXXIV, 1879, No. 59374,
http://www.nlr.ru/e-res/law_r/coll.php (preserving imprisonment in insolven-
cy cases generally, both commercial and civil).
128. The unpaid debt had to exceed 100 rubles for imprisonment to be im-
posed, and the term of imprisonment was determined by the court on a slid-
ing scale from six months to five years depending upon the size of the debt,
from 100 to more than 100,000 rubles. Ustav grazhdanskago sudoproizvod-
stva [Code of Civil Procedure], supra note 126, arts. 34, 36.
129. Id. arts. 57–67.
130. Id. art. 65.
131. Some vestige of insolvency law remained in the Soviet Civil Code in
the 1920s and 1930s, though addressing only the insolvency of state enter-
prises and collectives. After World War II, the notion of a planned national
economy largely excluded any purpose for bankruptcy as a concept, even for
enterprises, so the concept of bankruptcy was removed from Soviet law in the
1960s. See S.Yu. Zhuravlyov, Istoriya razvitiya zakonodatel’stva o bankrot-
stve v Rossii (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author at Nizhe-
gorodskaya Academy); Bankrotstvo, in 5 BROCKHAUS AND EFRON
ENCYCLOPEDICDICTIONARY, supra note 95.
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edict on insolvent state enterprises, and the legislature adopted
the first post-Soviet Russian bankruptcy law later that year.132
As previously discussed,133 lawmakers were not yet faced
with a pressing problem of personal overindebtedness yet, as
the consumer credit market was only in the earliest stages of
development. Not surprisingly, then, the 1992 bankruptcy law
addressed only business insolvency; that is, bankruptcies of en-
terprises and individual entrepreneurs.134 This law broke deci-
sively from the past with a major modern innovation: Debts
related to individual entrepreneurial activity not satisfied by
the proceeds of liquidation of the debtor’s nonexempt assets
would be discharged.135 This crucial provision was enshrined in
the Civil Code, as well, in a freestanding provision on “Insolven-
cy (bankruptcy) of individual entrepreneurs.” 136 Russian law-
makers thus enacted the first major characteristic of a modern
personal insolvency system: a discharge of unpaid debt follow-
ing bankruptcy proceedings, at least for entrepreneurs.
The economic situation had little time to evolve before the
second Russian bankruptcy law took the stage in 1998. This
law for the first time rhetorically revived the possibility of
bankruptcy of a nonentrepreneur individual (grazhdanin, “citi-
zen”).137 Personal bankruptcy would remain rhetoric only, how-
ever, until coordinating amendments were made to the Civil
132. Federal’nyi Zakon O nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve) No. 3929-1 [Fed-
eral Law on Insolvency (Bankruptcy) No. 3929-1], VEDOMOSTI S’EZDA
NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [VED. RF] [Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Depu-
ties of the Russian Federation and Supreme Council of the Russian Federa-
tion] 1992, No. 1, Item 6. For an overview of the presidential edict and the
new law, see Campbell, supra note 5, at 357–69; Paul R. Williams & Paul E.
Wade, Bankruptcy in Russia: The Evolution of a Comprehensive Russian
Bankruptcy Code, 21 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 511, 520–30 (1995).
133. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
134. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 362.
135. See Williams & Wade, supra note 132, at 530 (citing articles 35–36 of
the 1992 Law).
136. GRAZHDANSKIIKODEKSROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art.
25(4) (Russ.) (as adopted Nov. 30, 1994).
137. Federal’nyi Zakon No. 6-FZ RF o nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve) [Fed-
eral Law No. 6-FZ of the Russian Federation on Insolvency (Bankruptcy)],
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Collection of
Legislation of the Russian Federation] 1998, No. 2, Item 222. For an overview
of this law, see Tom Cummings, Survey of East European Law: Bankruptcy
Law Reform in Russia, 4 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 379, 390–93 (1997).
682 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
Code, which envisioned only bankruptcy for individual entre-
preneurs.138 In early 2000, the relatively short-lived insolvency
regulator, the Federal Service on Financial Rehabilitation and
Bankruptcy,139 presented a draft bill to the Ministries of Labor
and Justice to expand the Civil Code provision to apply to ordi-
nary citizens,140 but no major impetus existed yet for such a
revision. The market for personal credit was just beginning
what would be its massive expansion,141 and legislators had
larger unfinished business in the general bankruptcy law to
attend to.
The third time is a charm, and Russia’s third and currently
effective bankruptcy law emerged in 2002.142 This law was de-
signed to address several technical deficiencies of its predeces-
sor, particularly an enhanced and more rigorous definition of
“insolvency” to prevent small creditors (especially a debtor-
company’s competitors) from initiating bankruptcy cases to de-
stroy or take over relatively healthy businesses.143 Personal
(nonentrepreneur) bankruptcy was again acknowledged in con-
cept, but still shelved pending the adoption of amendments to
other federal laws, most notably the Civil Code.144
In mid-2004, as the growth rate of overdue consumer credit
churned past the dizzying growth rate of total outstanding
consumer debt,145 the need for personal bankruptcy legislation
gained the spotlight. The Department of Corporate Manage-
ment of the Ministry of Economic Development was assigned
138. See Cummings, supra note 137, at 393.
139. On the history and fate of this Service, see infra, note 202.
140. See Maksim Builov, Bankrot po sobstvennomu zhelaniyu, KOMMERS.
(Mar. 15, 2000), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/24119.
141. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
142. Federal’nyi Zakon No. 127-FZ RF o Nestostoyatel’nosti (Bankrotstve)
[Federal Law No. 127-FZ of the Russian Federation on Insolvency (Bankrupt-
cy)], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Collection
of Legislation of the Russian Federation] 2002, No. 43, Item 4190 [hereinafter
Law 127-FZ].
143. See Sidney B. Brooks, The International Scene: Three’s a Charm? Rus-
sia Adopts Third Bankruptcy Law in 10 Years, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June
2002, at 22, 22; Sabrina Tavernise, Using Bankruptcy as a Takeover Tool;
Russian Law Puts Healthy Companies at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/07/business/international-business-using-
bankruptcy-takeover-tool-russian-law-puts-healthy.html.
144. See Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 231(2).
145. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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responsibility for bankruptcy matters generally,146 and it im-
mediately set to work on a personal bankruptcy bill.147 It
pressed its vision for personal bankruptcy law as a court-
supported forum for facilitating individual debtors’ negotia-
tions to restructure their unsustainable debts and, if the debtor
were declared bankrupt, to obtain a discharge, “having trans-
ferred to creditors [the debtor’s] property and a part of [the
debtor’s] income.”148
The Ministry’s proposal broadly reflected European ap-
proaches to personal insolvency. Indeed, it was based in part on
an international survey of what the Ministry touted as “suffi-
ciently successful mechanisms” of personal insolvency resolu-
tion, specifically mentioning structures in the United States,
Germany, and Sweden.149 The essence of the proposal would
survive an arduous legislative process and become Russia’s
new personal bankruptcy law. It included a subjective “insol-
vency” entry criterion,150 an option for debtors with regular in-
come to propose to creditors a trustee-administered plan for
146. See Iulya Proskuryakova, Sezon oxoty na bankrotov, ROSSIISKAYA
GAZETA (Nov. 16, 2004, 5:00 AM), http://rg.ru/2004/11/16/bankrotstvo.html.
147. Reabilitatsionnyye protsedury, primenyayemyye v otnoshenii grazhdan-
dolzhnikov, MINEKONOMRAZVITIYA ROSSII (Sept. 2, 2004),
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/CorpManagment/bankruptcy/do
c20040901_08.
148. Id.
149. See Poyasnitel’naya zapiska k proyektu federal’nogo zakona “O reabili-
tatsionnyx protsedurax, primenyayemyx v otnoshenii grazhdanina-dolzhnika”,
MINEKONOMRAZVITIYA ROSSII (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/CorpManagment/bankruptcy/do
c1259162688648 (unpublished explanatory note to an early Ministry pro-
posal, which remained almost verbatim the same through several iterations,
including the final bill that became the new law); see also Aktual’nye voprosy
sovershenstvovaniya zakonodatel’stva o nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve) v
chasti vvedeniya reabilitatsionnyx protsedur v otnoshenii grazhdanina-
dolzhnika, GARANT (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://www.garant.ru/action/interview/10246/ [hereinafter MER Interview]
(online interview with acting director of Department of Corporate Manage-
ment of Ministry of Economic Development, Dmitrii Skripichnikov, referenc-
ing international practice at several different points).
150. See Proyekt Federal’nogo zakona “O reabilitatsionnyx protsedurax,
primenyayemyx v otnoshenii grazhdanina-dolzhnika” [Project/Bill of a Fed-
eral Law “On Rehabilitative Procedures Applied with Respect to a Citizen-
Debtor], arts. 3, 9(3), 10(1), MINEKONOMRAZVITIYA ROSSII (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/CorpManagment/bankruptcy/do
c1259162688648.
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restructuring their debts over five years,151 and a limited possi-
bility for the court to impose the debtor’s “best efforts” plan on
creditors.152 Alternatively, the law permitted the court to de-
clare the debtor bankrupt, order a trustee to liquidate the
debtor’s nonexempt assets, including income in excess of the
statutory subsistence minimum earned during liquidation, dis-
tribute the proceeds to creditors, and automatically discharge
most remaining debts.153 Debtors declared bankrupt would in-
cur an affirmative obligation to inform lenders of the bankrupt-
cy for the next five years, and they could seek no further bank-
ruptcy relief during that same five-year period.154 To allow the
commercial courts to prepare for these new cases, the bill’s ef-
fective date was set at one year after passage into law.155
For eight years, this perfectly sound project went in circles.
Round after round of intragovernmental review and approval
was followed by inexplicable delays and orders for reconsidera-
tion, the result of political resistance from a powerful bank lob-
by, along with a good measure of fear of the unknown.156 For
example, one well-respected, prominent news source reported
that under U.S. personal bankruptcy law, individual debtors
lose the right to borrow in the future, and a debtor who know-
ingly borrowed more than his or her income could be thrown in
jail—which is at best misleading, and in all but the most excep-
151. Id. arts. 16–20.
152. Id. art. 21(2).
153. Id. arts. 21(4), 29–33.
154. Id. art. 35.
155. Id. art. 39; see “Fiziki” smogut bankrotit’sya, FINANS (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.finansmag.ru/news/44992.
156. See, e.g., Minekonomrazvitiya vernulos’ k zakonu o bankrotstve fizi-
cheskix lits, NEWSRU (Apr. 11, 2011, 8:49 AM),
http://www.newsru.com/finance/11apr2011/bankrupsy.html; Bankrot po
sobstvennomu zhelaniyu, IZVESTIA (Apr. 11, 2011, 12:28 AM),
http://izvestia.ru/news/373510 (noting intragovernmental opposition in 2008
due to an inadequate definition of “insolvency” and an overly generous list of
exempt property); Banki protiv zakona a bankrotstve fizicheskix lits,
NEWSLAND (Oct. 19, 2011, 1:03 PM),
http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/805768/; MER Interview, supra note 149
(noting common fears born of a lack of understanding of the essence of the
bankruptcy process); V Gosdume uzhe obsuzhdayut zakonoproekt o bankrot-
stve fizlits, PRAVO.RU (Mar. 22, 2010, 10:53 AM),
http://www.pravo.ru/news/view/26648/ (noting a “round table” discussion fol-
lowing a delay in 2010 for consideration of the economic impact of the intro-
duction of the institution of personal bankruptcy).
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tional case, simply false.157 The bank lobby was particularly
active at every turn in opposing any notion of personal insol-
vency relief.158
Finally, in July 2012, the political stars began to align, and
the first personal bankruptcy bill that would become law was
introduced in the State Duma.159 After a supportive first read-
ing,160 however, the bill ground to a halt for another two years
while the Committee on Property considered hundreds of
amendments, some quite substantive (as discussed below161).162
157. See Yulia Vasil’eva, Grazhdanin bankrot: Pravitel’stvo rassmotrit za-
kon o bankrotstve fizicheskix lits, ROS. GAZ. (Nov. 7, 2007, 6:00 AM),
http://www.rg.ru/2007/11/07/bankrotstvo.html.
158. See, e.g., Tai Adelaja, The Russian Government Gives Green Light to a
New Consumer Bankruptcy Law, RUSSIA PROFILE (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://russiaprofile.org/business/56857.html (quoting Sergei Gavrilov, chair of
the State Duma Committee on Property, criticizing the obstructionism of
bank lobbies in the consideration of personal bankruptcy law, and noting op-
position from the Finance Ministry); Banki opasayutsya bankrotsta fiziche-
kskix lits, FINROSSIYA (July 9, 2013), http://finrussia.ru/news/show/banki-
opasajutsja-bankrotstva-fizicheskih-lic-130709005 (noting opposition from
banks and Ministry of Finance); Alexander Bayazitova, Bankrotstvo teryaet
fizicheskoe litso, KOMMERS. (July 8, 2013), http://kommersant.ru/doc/2228112
(noting that the bank lobby expressed concern in a meeting with President
Putin that the law was “untimely”).
159. Zakonoproekt No. 105976-6, O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nii zakon
“O nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve)” i otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi
Federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya reabilitatsionnyx protsedur, primenyaemyx
v otnoshenii grazhdanina-dolzhnika [Draft Law No. 105976-6, On the Intro-
duction of Amendments to the Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” and
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regulating Rehabilitation
Procedures Applied with Respect to a Citizen-Debtor],
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(SpravkaNew)?OpenAgent&RN=105976-
6 (last updated Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Legislative History] (the official
legislative record of the bill, with attached documents).
160. The usual legislative process in Russia is broken into several steps,
most importantly a series of three “readings” of a bill in the lower house of
the legislature, the State Duma. The first reading simply solicits general
support of the bill in concept. Preparation for the second reading involves a
probing examination and often substantial revision of the pending bill by the
official assigned committee (in this case, the Committee on Property), and the
second reading passes on these amendments. A bill is ultimately adopted by
the Duma in a formal third reading, which is little more than pro forma if the
second reading process has been carried out properly. The bill then must be
approved after brief consideration by the upper house, the Federation Coun-
cil, culminating in the final step, signature by the President. See generally
WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 8.140–62 (3d ed. 2009).
161. See infra Part III.C.1.
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Once revised and back on the rails, the bill was on a fast track
to final adoption by the Duma in a third reading on December
19, 2014, approval by the Federation Council on December 25,
2014,163 and signature by President Putin on December 29,
2014,164 as Law No. 476-FZ.165 But the Odyssey wasn’t over yet.
In a last-minute volte face on the court system to be assigned
responsibility for these new cases166 and a delayed effective
date for the new law, the Duma repealed most of Law No. 476-
FZ and reenacted it in slightly revised form in June 2015 as an
appendage to a new Law No. 154-FZ, signed on June 29, 2015,
effective October 1, 2015.167
C. The New Russian Personal Insolvency Regime: Lessons
Learned and Not Learned
At last, this section examines the specifics of the new person-
al bankruptcy provisions, which were incorporated by revision
162. See Legislative History, supra note 159 (showing the second reading
period stretching from first reading approval on November 14, 2012, to the
proposed adoption of the bill on second reading on November 14, 2014).
163. Note that Russia officially celebrates Orthodox Christian holidays, so
the last two weeks of December are ordinary work days, while the first week-
and-a-half of the New Year is an extended holiday period. See Perechen’ ne-
rabochix prazdnichnyx dnei i perenesyonnyx vyxodnyx dnei v 2015 godu,
CENT. BANK RUSS. FED’N, http://cbr.ru/pw.aspx?file=/other/holidays_2015.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
164. See Legislative History, supra note 159.
165. Federal’nyi Zakon RF No. 476-F o vnesenii izmenenii v federal’nii za-
kon “o nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve)” i otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty ros-
siiskoi federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya reabilitatsionnyx protsedur,
primenyaemyx v otnoshenii grazhdanina-dolzhnika [Federal Law of the Rus-
sian Federation No. 476-F on the Introduction of Amendments to the Federal
Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Rus-
sian Federation Regulating Rehabilitation Procedures Applied with Respect
to a Citizen-Debtor], ROS. GAZ. (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201412290042.
166. See infra note 187.
167. Federal’nyi Zakon RF No. 154-FZ “Ob uregulirovanii osobennostei
nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstva) na territorii Respubliki Krym i goroda feder-
al’nogo znacheniya Sevastopolya i o vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye za-
konodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [Federal Law of the Russian Feder-
ation No. 154-FZ “On the Regulation of the Particulars of Insolvency (Bank-
ruptcy) Within the Territory of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City
of Sevastopol and on the Introduction of Amendments to Certain Legislative
Acts of the Russian Federation”], arts. 2–4, 6–14, ROS. GAZ. (July 3, 2015),
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201506300005.
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into the Civil Code168 and the existing general bankruptcy law,
in particular Part X.169 Before laying out the operation of the
new regime, it is worth pausing to address why Russia depart-
ed from its historically debtor-punitive and creditor-centric
bankruptcy policy. What role did lawmakers hope this new re-
gime would play? It turns out that the answers for Russia res-
onate perfectly with the answers provided by other European
lawmakers as personal bankruptcy has developed there over
the past thirty years: These laws are not motivated so much by
compassion for human suffering or pity for poor debtors, but
more by a desire to establish a more rational balance among
the economic interests of creditors, debtors, and most im-
portantly, the society on which their actions have a far-
reaching impact.170 Lawmakers hoped with this new law to
“substantially reduce societal tension” created by unregulated
defaults.171
It is both telling and fitting that this project was assigned to
the ministry in charge of economic development, as economic
concerns were the primary driving forces behind the Russian
law, just as they had been elsewhere in Europe. Lawmakers
were concerned that a sudden explosion in the volume of con-
sumer credit, especially credit in default, was undermining
consumer confidence and purchasing power, “not at all stimu-
lating the business activity of the populace.”172 Creditors also
168. Id. art. 2 (amending art. 25 to encompass the bankruptcy of all indi-
viduals, entrepreneur or not).
169. Id. art. 6.
170. See World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 56–111; Jason J. Kilborn, Two Dec-
ades, Three Key Questions, and Evolving Answers in European Consumer
Insolvency Law: Responsibility, Discretion, and Sacrifice, in CONSUMER
CREDIT, DEBT& BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
307, 308–14 (Johanna Niemi, et. al eds., 2009); MER Interview, supra note
149 (expressing Russian lawmakers’ goal to benefit not just debtors or credi-
tors, but both of these groups and society as well).
171. See Sergei Gurkin, Gosduma prinyala zakon o bankrotstve fizicheskix
lits v pervom chtenii, DP (Nov. 14, 2012, 6:37 PM),
http://www.dp.ru/a/2012/11/14/gosduma_prinjala_zakon_o_b/ (quoting Sergei
Gavrilov, chair of the State Duma Committee on Property, the committee
responsible for the personal bankruptcy bill).
172. Poyasnitel’naya zapiska k proektu federal’nogo zakona “O vnesenii iz-
menenii v Federal’nii zakon ‘O nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve)’” i otdel’nye
zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya reabili-
tatsionnyx protsedur, primenyaemyx v otnoshenii grazhdanina-dolzhnika”
[Explanatory Note to the Draft Bill of a Federal Law “On the Introduction of
688 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
suffered, as the ordinary debt collection process favored the ag-
gressive and sophisticated, imposed unnecessary and unpro-
ductive costs on creditors, and led to “quasi-criminal means of
collecting debts,” further increasing the costs of debt service.173
Banks are better off, lawmakers reasoned, allowing an insol-
vent debtor “to preserve property and social status with a re-
structuring.”174 In any case, banks needed to improve their ac-
countability and stability by cleaning their balance sheets of
hopelessly uncollectible consumer debts.175 The law’s primary
function was to “stimulate citizen-debtors and their creditors to
civilized methods of restructuring debt” and to allow Russian
law “to conform to market realities.”176 Even if a restructuring
is not possible, the bankruptcy process at least allowed for a
final solution for debtors “to be freed from debts, having sur-
rendered [their] property for satisfaction of creditors.”177
This following section first presents the framework of the
personal bankruptcy regime under the new Russian law, with a
few predictions of how it will likely operate on the ground. It
then proceeds to evaluate this framework in light of the inter-
national best practices discussed above,178 as well as potential
practical complications in the specific context of Russia today.
1. Presentation: An Integrated Regime Along European Lines
The structure of the law tracks other European models, with
some interesting twists. Some of these become clear only from a
close cross-referencing of distant provisions, as well as consid-
Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)’” and Certain
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regulating Rehabilitative Proce-
dures Applied with Respect to a Citizen-Debtor”] (2012) [hereinafter Explana-
tory Note], in Legislative History, supra note 159.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Zakliucheniye Obshchestvennoi palaty RF 2 (Aug. 7, 2012), in Leg-
islative History, supra note 159; Zakliuchenie otvetsvennogo kommiteta
(Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Dumy o voprosam sobstvennosti) 3–4 (Sept. 20,
2012), in Legislative History, supra note 159.
176. Explanatory Note, supra note 172, at 5; see also MER Interview, supra
note 149 (“[I]n everyone’s life, situations happen when, by the force of one or
another reason, people lose their job, an economic downturn occurs. Citizens
are rendered incapable of fulfilling obligations they have undertaken . . . . In
such situations, a compromise option should be found.”).
177. Explanatory Note, supra note 172, at 2.
178. See supra Part II.
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eration of the conditions on the ground in Russia today. This
section will make these connections and reveal the likely oper-
ation of the new law in action.
a. Case Initiation/Access
In Russia, as elsewhere, a personal bankruptcy case can be
initiated either the traditional way, that is, against an individ-
ual debtor by his or her creditors as a means of debt collection,
or the modern way, by the debtor as a means to obtaining re-
lief.179 Given the availability of relatively effective, individual-
ized debt collection processes, individual creditors have little
incentive to use the collective vehicle of bankruptcy as a means
of pursuing their individual claims, but experience elsewhere
in Europe suggests that many Russian creditors (primarily
banks) will likely initiate bankruptcy cases against individual
debtors.180
Many petitions, and probably most, however, will be filed by
debtors seeking relief from their debts (this article will there-
fore largely ignore the specific rules on creditors’ petitions). Be-
cause Russia lacks an organized system of consumer debt ad-
vice or counseling services,181 one of two things will most likely
179. Federal’nyi Zakon No. 127-FZ RF o Nestostoyatel’nosti (Bankrotstve)
[Federal Law No. 127-FZ of the Russian Federation on Insolvency (Bankrupt-
cy)], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Collection
of Legislation of the Russian Federation] 2002, No. 43, Item 4190, art.
213.3(1).
180. See Elena Pashutinskaya, Bankrot platit’ obyazan, KOMMERS. (June 25,
2015), http://kommersant.ru/doc/2753811 (noting a prediction that banks will
soon use bankruptcy rather than individual enforcement procedures in most
or all debt collections cases). For a discussion of this theoretical conundrum
and recent European experience with creditor-initiated personal bankruptcy
cases, see Jason Kilborn & Adrian Walters, Involuntary Bankruptcy as Debt
Collection: Multi-Jurisdictional Lessons in Choosing the Right Tool for the
Job, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123 (2013).
181. The new institution of “Financial Ombudsman” fills a small part of this
void, though its heritage makes it an unlikely candidate for dispassionate
advice to overindebted consumers. In the fall of 2010, the Association of Rus-
sian Banks adopted a charter creating a Financial Ombudsman as a mediator
of credit disputes with citizens. The most common request from consumers
has been about restructuring unsustainable debt, but while the Ombudsman
might suggest such a restructuring, his suggestions are just that—
recommendations—though the banks have often accepted the Ombudsman’s
proposals. See Anastasiya Ivelich, Finansovyi ombudsmen: kto on takoi i
chem mozhet byt’ polezen zayomshchiku, KREDITY.RU,
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happen: debtors will have to pay a lawyer to help prepare their
petitions, or they will file pro se. The former route can be ex-
pensive. Lawyers and accountants have been helping individu-
al entrepreneurs file bankruptcy petitions for years,182 and
many started advertising their services to all individual debt-
ors soon after the new personal bankruptcy law was passed.183
A firm in St. Petersburg, for example, lists prices online for in-
dividual bankruptcy representation, with a “Bankruptcy lite”
package of simple advice on proceeding pro se at 10,000 rubles,
along with a full-service representation “Bankruptcy turnkey”
package “from 15,000 rubles per month.”184 Even a modest es-
timate of six months of full-service representation would thus
cost three times the gross average monthly wage in mid-
2015.185 The less expensive route—debtors’ going it alone, with
http://www.credits.ru/article/finansovyy-ombudsmen-kto-on-takoy-i-chem-
mozhet-byt-polezen-zaemschiku (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). The creation of
this institution seems to have been a clever attempt by banks to divert bor-
rowers away from an expected personal bankruptcy regime—we will now see
if debtors develop restructuring plans more frequently in cooperation with
the Ombudsman or in the bankruptcy process.
182. Cases involving individual entrepreneurs will now be governed by the
new general personal bankruptcy rules. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art.
214.1.
183. A search of the internet in Russian for “bankrotstvo fizlits” produces
over one hundred thousand hits, many of which are law firms advertising
their services, even before the new law has become effective. For example, on
the dividing line between Europe and Asia in Ekaterinburg (formerly Sverd-
lovsk), a “Center for Assistance in Individual Bankruptcy” began advertising
its services on the internet in May 2015. See Mikhail Sachev, Bankrotstvo
Grazhdan, SACHEV.RU, http://sachev.ru/bankrotstvo_grazhdan.htm (last visit-
ed Feb. 28, 2016).
184. Stoimost’ bankrotstva fizicheskix lits, BANKROT KONSALT,
http://2lex.ru/bankrotstvo-fizicheskih-lits/stoimost-bankrotstva-fizicheskih-
lits/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
185. For information on official and unofficial average monthly wages for
2015, see Srednie zarplaty po Rossii [Average Salaries Across Russia],
KADROVYE AGENSTVA ROSSII [RECRUITMENT AGENCIES OF RUSSIA] (2015),
https://person-agency.ru/salary.html (indicating a rough average of 30,000
rubles per month, before deduction of the flat 13 percent income tax, across a
number of official and unofficial indicators, though noting that the average
wage varies significantly across regions; over 40,000 rubles per month in
Moscow, for example, but 31,000 or less in St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg,
and about 25,000 in other notable regions, such as Omsk and Tomsk and
Perm’). In terms of purchasing power parity, 90,000 rubles was equivalent to
about $4700 USD in 2014, and probably far less today. See World Develop-
ment Indicators: Exchange Rates and Prices, WORLD BANK (2014),
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or without 10,000 rubles of advice on which forms to fill—will
lead inevitably to errors, delays, and burdens on the commer-
cial court system. The first European personal insolvency sys-
tem, in Denmark, has struggled with exactly this problem since
its inception in the mid-1980s: More than half of all petitions
there are rejected, many (if not most) as a result of debtors’ er-
rors in preparing petitions and supporting documentation.186
Another potential complication is the filing location, though
the courts already have a sophisticated solution to that prob-
lem. Bankruptcy cases for individuals are within the jurisdic-
tion of the commercial (arbitrazh) courts187 for the place of the
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.16 (indicating a PPP of 19.1 rubles per US
dollar in 2014).
186. See Kilborn, supra note 55, at 169–70.
187. The assignment of personal bankruptcy cases to the commercial courts,
as opposed to the courts of general jurisdiction, has been a long-festering
point of contention. In response to the Ministry proposal vesting jurisdiction
in the commercial courts, the Supreme Court acted on a Presidential initia-
tive to introduce a bill in April 2013 to reassign jurisdiction to the ordinary
civil courts. See Verxovnyi sud nameren zabrat’ dela o bankrotstve fizlits u
arbitrazha, ROS. GAZ. (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/02/vs-
anons.html. The Court based its proposed revision on two principal grounds:
access to justice (as the commercial courts are few, concentrated in distant
regional centers, whereas the ordinary civil courts are numerous and easily
accessible to citizens) and subject matter (unlike commercial bankruptcies,
personal bankruptcy cases will raise issues of family, labor, contracts, etc.,
that would otherwise be governed by general civil law)—and it noted that no
additional financing would be required for the general civil courts. Id.;
Vladislav Kulikov, Ne Zvenit, ROS. GAZ. (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/23/bankrotstvo.html. Proponents of assigning these
cases to the commercial courts argued that the civil courts are notoriously
overburdened and delayed, all other bankruptcy cases are administered in
the commercial courts, including those involving individual entrepreneurs, so
the commercial courts can and did handle personal bankruptcies already, and
bankruptcy law is a complex and nuanced area of law that requires special-
ized knowledge and expertise that the general civil courts lack. See id.; Anna
Zanina, “Nikakie voprosy vnutri sudebnoi sistemy ne dolzhny reshat’sya bez
mneniya vysshego suda”, KOMMERS. (June 20, 2013),
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2215570. In the end, the Supreme Court re-
considered its position, but by that point, the bill had been revised in commit-
tee and passed as Law No. 476-FZ, assigning jurisdiction to the ordinary
courts; therefore, the law had to be repealed and reenacted as Law No. 154-
FZ to return jurisdiction to the commercial courts, with a three-month delay
of the effective date to allow the commercial courts to prepare. See Vladislav
Kulikov, V dolgu ne ostavyat, ROS. GAZ. (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.rg.ru/2015/03/04/bankrotstva.html; Vasilii Mironov, Bankrotstvo
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debtor’s residence, so petitions and supporting documents must
be filed there.188 The “place” of the debtor’s residence, in the
case of the sparse commercial courts, however, represents an
often very expansive area. Russia occupies more territory than
any country in the world, yet it has only eighty-odd commercial
courts, one in each “subject” of the federation.189 These “sub-
jects” are similar in size (and sometimes political power) to
U.S. states or European countries, and they are often vastly
larger.190 The cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg are their own
relatively small subjects, but so is the Siberian Krasnoyarsk
Krai, occupying more than 2.3 million square kilometers191—
more than five times the size of California—yet like the other
subjects, it hosts only one commercial court, in its main city of
nearly three million inhabitants, Krasnoyarsk.192 Luckily, the
commercial courts have been at the forefront of engagement
with technological advances,193 and the new law establishes an
fizlits otlozhat do oseni, ROS. GAZ. (June 16, 2015, 8:01 PM),
http://rg.ru/2015/06/16/bankrotstvo-site.html (citing a statement from Sergei
Gavrilov, chair of the State Duma Committee on Property, that the commer-
cial courts are better prepared for bankruptcy cases than courts of general
jurisdiction, but even the commercial courts need more time to prepare); An-
na Zanina, Bankrotstva grazhdan razvodilis’, KOMMERS. (July 7, 2015),
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2762937. The dispute continues, however, as a bill
was introduced less than a month after passage of the revised law to reassign
jurisdiction over limited aspects of personal bankruptcy cases to ordinary
civil courts. Id.
188. Federal’nyi Zakon No. 127-FZ RF o Nestostoyatel’nosti (Bankrotstve)
[Federal Law No. 127-FZ of the Russian Federation on Insolvency (Bankrupt-
cy)], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Collection
of Legislation of the Russian Federation] 2002, No. 43, Item 4190, art. 33(1).
189. See Butler, supra note 160, at 6.68–69.
190. See id. at 8.18–.23.
191. Territoriya, chislo rayonov, naselonnykh punktov i sel’skikh admin-
istratsiy po subyektam Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Territory, Number of Districts,
Inhabited Localities, and Rural Administration by Federal Subjects of the
Russian Federation], in FEDERAL’NAYA SLUZHBA GOSUDARSTVENNOY STATISTIKI
[FEDERAL STATE STATISTICS SERVICE], VSEROSSIYSKAYA PEREPIS’ NASELENIYA
2002 GODA [ALL-RUSSIA POPULATION CENSUS OF 2002] (2002).
192. For the locations of each of the subjects’ commercial courts (and a
sense of the vast territory that separates many of these from outlying areas),
see the website of the commercial courts, Arbitrazhnyye sudy subyektov RF,
FEDERAL’NYYE ARBITRAZHNYYE SUDY ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII,
http://www.arbitr.ru/as/subj/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
193. See Andrey Soloviev & Yury Filippov, Course of Justice of Arbitration
Courts in the Russian Federation, 3 L. & MOD. STATES 65, 68 (2013). For free
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entitlement for any participant in a bankruptcy case to take
advantage of electronic filing rules.194
Commercial court procedures are document driven,195 so
along with their bankruptcy petitions, debtors are required
to file a substantial sheaf of papers describing and document-
ing their financial history and current situation.196 Among the
most important are documents establishing that the debtor
meets the entry criterion of insolvency (neplatyozhesposobnost’,
literally, inability to pay).197 This key term is defined analo-
access to the commercial courts’ impressive technical interface for electronic
filing and information, see My Arbitr, FEDERAL’NYYE ARBITRAZHNYYE SUDY
ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, https://my.arbitr.ru/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
194. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, arts. 34(3), 35(4). Attending hearings is
another matter. While parties cannot attend a hearing remotely from a loca-
tion other than another commercial court site, see Soloviev & Filippov, supra
note 193, at 69, they can be represented by counsel and not appear personal-
ly, ARBITRAZHNYI PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [APK RF]
[Code of Arbitration Procedure] art. 59. The possibility has been discussed for
several years of deploying mobile offices of the commercial courts (on buses)
with video conferencing equipment. See Olga Buxarova, Avtobus ne pridyot,
ROS. GAZ. (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/04/sudi.html; Kulikov, su-
pra note 187.
195. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, Are Russian Judges Still Soviet?, 23 POST-
SOVIET AFFAIRS 240, 244, 256 (2007); Kathryn Hendley, Business Litigation in
the Transition: A Portrait of Debt Collection in Russia, 38 L. & SOC’YREV. 305,
310 (2004).
196. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.4(3).
197. See id. arts. 213.4(2), 213.6(2)–(3). There is a parallel, additional, ob-
jective entry-criterion that must be shown by creditors filing involuntary pe-
titions; that is, the debtor has been in default on debt exceeding 500,000 ru-
bles for longer than three months. Id. art. 213.3(2). The debtor is also re-
quired to file a bankruptcy petition if satisfying one or more creditor(s) would
render the debtor incapable of fulfilling at least 500,000 rubles of monetary
obligations to other creditors in full within thirty days of their due dates
(failure subjects the debtor to a potential fine of 1000-3000 rubles), id. art.
213.4(1); insolvency (neplatyozhesposobnost’) must still be demonstrated for
either of these petitions to be accepted by the court. Law 127-FZ, art.
213.6(3); KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII OB ADMINISTRATIVNYX
PRAVONARUSHENIYAX [KOAP RF] [Code of Administrative Violations] art.
14.13(5). This minimum-debt-in-default rule was originally to be applied to
voluntary debtor petitions, to keep the number of these new cases down, at
least initially, but in its final form, the law does not apply the minimum-debt-
in-default rule to voluntary petitions by debtors. See Mariya Glushenkova,
Esli by ya byl bankrot, KOMMERS. (June 15, 2015),
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2734461; Evgeniya Kriuchkova, Vyxod est’,
KOMMERS. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2635039. A mini-
mum-in-default-for-three-months rule is a classic Russian approach to pre-
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gously to similar definitions in other European personal bank-
ruptcy laws: “circumstances, obviously indicating that [the
debtor] is not in a condition to fulfill monetary obligations [in
full] . . . within the established period.”198 The debtor is aided in
this showing by a legal presumption of insolvency if any one of
a series of circumstances is demonstrated, such as complete
cessation of payment on due debts, default on greater than 10
percent of all monetary debts for longer than one month, or
debt exceeding the value of all the debtor’s property.199 This
presumption can be rebutted by evidence that the debtor plans
to receive money within “a not extended period” that would al-
low for full payment of all due debts.200
The debtor must also nominate, and deposit part of the fee
for, a case trustee, called a “financial administrator.”201 Insol-
vency professionals in Russia are governed by private, self-
venting excessive creditor use of bankruptcy. Such a provision was present in
President Yeltsin’s 1992 Edict and the first Russian Federation bankruptcy
law of 1993. SeeWilliams & Wade, supra note 132, at 520–21, 523–24, as well
as the 1998 law (imposing, for the first time, a duty to file on companies who
cannot pay all debts without rendering themselves unable to pay others);
Cummings, supra note 138, at 381, 390–91. For personal bankruptcy cases,
the figure grew from 10,000 in the first Ministry proposals, to 50,000 in the
bill, revised to 300,000 and then 500,000 in the final law. See Explanatory
Note, supra note 172, at 2. The IMF is not a fan of this approach; it favors the
approach taken by Russia for debtor petitions. When Lithuania proposed a
bipartite access test, like the Russian one, with a debt figure and an insol-
vency test, the IMF balked, remarking “it is advisable to have a single and
clear insolvency threshold” and suggesting a singular focus on the more
meaningful insolvency test of “inability to pay debts as they fall due.” Int’l
Monetary Fund, Republic of Lithuania: Technical Assistance Report on Pro-
posals for Reforming the Insolvency Regime 4 (IMF Country Report No.
11/320, 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11320.pdf.
198. See Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, arts. 213.4(2); id. art. 213.6(3). This
language is very similar to the definition of “overindebtedness” in other Eu-
ropean personal insolvency laws.
199. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.6(3).
200. Id.
201. Id. arts. 2, 213.4(4). The financial administrator has a variety of du-
ties, including analyzing the debtor’s financial situation, investigating for
assets and any evidence of bankruptcy fraud, collecting and distributing on
creditor claims, conducting meetings of creditors, monitoring the debtor’s
compliance with an adopted restructuring plan, and liquidating the debtor’s
nonexempt property. Id. art. 213.9(8).
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regulated organizations (“SROs”).202 The debtor identifies the
SRO from whose membership the financial administrator for
the case will be selected, and the court appoints a member,
presumably from a list supplied by the various SROs.203 The
debtor must also deposit 10,000 rubles as a one-time fee for
remuneration for this private administrator’s work on the
case.204 The debtor’s only other case administration expenses
are for a relatively modest one-time filing fee205 and for publi-
cation of around six to ten official notices relating to the course
of the proceedings,206 which lawmakers expressly made less ex-
pensive by the creation of an electronic Unitary Federal Regis-
ter of Bankruptcy Data.207
202. As of mid-July 2015, there were fifty-five active SROs listed in the
Unitary Federal Register of Bankruptcy Data, with over ten thousand total
members. See Samoreguliruemye organizatsii arbitrazhnyx upravlyayush-
chix, EDINYI FEDERAL’NYI REESTR SVEDENII O BANKROTSTVE,
http://bankrot.fedresurs.ru/SroList.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). A central
government regulator of sorts existed in one iteration or another from Sep-
tember 1993 to March 2004, most recently called the Federal Service on Fi-
nancial Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy, but a nationwide push for decentrali-
zation and reduction of bureaucratic hurdles devolved regulatory power to
these SROs in the early 2000s. See Elena Shmeleva, Dolzhnik pod kontrolem:
Fiskal’naya sluzhba zastavit vernut’ den’gi v kaznu, ROS. GAZ. (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.rg.ru/2012/10/23/doljnik.html; Alexander Yerofeyev, Development
of the Russian Bankruptcy Regime: Law and Practice, 10 INT’L INSOLVENCY
REV. 115, 116, 136–37 (2001); Artur Trapitsyn et. al, The Russian Approach
to Modern Insolvency Management, EUROFENIX, Spring 2008, at 9,
www.hww.eu/sites/default/files/Eurofenix_Spring_08_Russia_02.pdf; Brooks,
supra note 143, at 22.
203. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, arts. 42(9), 45, 213.4(4), 213.6(4).
204. See id. art. 213.4(4). The debtor can request that this deposit be put off
until the date of the first hearing, but there is no in forma pauperis method of
seeking relief if the deposit cannot be made. Id. At the end of the case, the
administrator also stands to earn 2 percent of either (1) payments made pur-
suant to a restructuring plan or (2) assets distributed to creditors in a bank-
ruptcy liquidation. Id. art. 20.6(3), (17), 213.9(3)–(4).
205. The filing fee (gosposhlina) for personal bankruptcy seems to be 6000
rubles, though these fees change over time and can be checked by using the
online fee calculator for any given commercial court. The one for the Moscow
court can be found, for example, at Kalkulyator gosposhliny, FEDERAL’NYYE
ARBITRAZHNYYE SUDY ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII,
http://msk.arbitr.ru/process/duty/calc (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
206. See Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.7.
207. See EDINYI FEDERAL’NYI REESTR SVEDENII O BANKROTSTVE,
http://bankrot.fedresurs.ru/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016); MER Interview, supra
note 149 (noting goals of the Register of cost savings for debtors and bank-
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The court must evaluate the debtor’s petition at a hearing
within three months of the petition’s filing.208 Not only are the
commercial courts driven by documents, they are driven by the
calendar, as well. As members of a civil service, commercial
court judges have an impressive history of adherence to strict
deadlines for case administration, as evaluations for salary in-
creases and promotions are based in large part on observance
of these work-rhythm scheduling rules (as well as rates of re-
versal on appeal).209 If at the hearing the court finds that the
documents establish that the debtor meets the entry require-
ment(s), the court enters an order opening the case,210 a stay of
any enforcement action by creditors (including secured credi-
tors) is imposed,211 and the case proceeds to the first of two
phases: a period for creditors’ consideration of a restructuring
plan, and/or a declaration of the debtor’s bankruptcy and a liq-
uidation and distribution procedure.
b. Restructuring Plan Option
Within two months of publication of the order opening the
case, creditors must submit their claims to the financial admin-
istrator,212 and the debtor has an opportunity to present a re-
structuring plan to creditors up to ten days before the expira-
tion of this two-month period.213 To be entitled to submit a re-
ruptcy estates, as well as transparency and accessibility of information).
Posting on the Unitary Register costs only 300–350 rubles per listing, half
the cost of listings in commercial bankruptcy cases. See Otvety na chasto za-
davaemye voporosy, EDINYI FEDERAL’NYI REESTR SVEDENII O BANKROTSTVE,
http://bankrot.fedresurs.ru/Help/FAQ_EFRSB.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(FAQ for the Register, including no. 5, the cost of commercial listings); Law
127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.7(4) (imposing the half-price rule for bank-
ruptcy cases of individuals); Constantine Milantiev, Zakon o bankrotstve fizi-
cheskix lits, BANKROT KONSALT, http://2lex.ru/bankrotstvo-fizicheskih-
lits/zakon-o-bankrotstve-fizicheskih-litz/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
208. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.6(5).
209. See Hendley, supra note 195, at 244, 259–60.
210. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, arts. 213.6.
211. Id. arts. 18.1, 213.10(1), 213.11. Unmatured claims are accelerated,
and accruing interest, fines, and penalties stop, as well. Id. art. 213.11(2).
212. Id. art. 213.8(2).
213. Id. art. 213.12(1). At any time, the debtor and creditors can also con-
clude a settlement agreement (mirovoe soglashenie), which like a restructur-
ing agreement is adopted by majority vote of the meeting of creditors, but
unlike a restructuring agreement, has no prescribed maximum time limit. Id.
arts. 15, 150, 151, 155–59, 213.31.
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structuring plan, the debtor must have a source of income and
cannot have been convicted of certain economic crimes.214 Those
who do not meet these requirements can request that the case
proceed immediately to the liquidation and distribution pro-
cesses.215 In a provision unique to the Russian law (added in
the legislative revision process), creditors are also allowed to
propose restructuring plans,216 though they must indicate
whether the debtor has agreed or objected to their plan.217
The contents of the plan (e.g., time extensions, interest re-
ductions, principal forgiveness) are limited only by creditors’
willingness to accept the terms,218 though the plan may not ex-
tend beyond three years.219 For most debtors with substantial
debt burdens, three years is insufficient time to allow for full
payment; therefore, restructuring plans will have to contain
some measure of debt forgiveness. Creditors vote on a restruc-
turing plan at a meeting of creditors convened by the financial
administrator within four months after publication of the case
opening order (sixty additional days beyond the claims submis-
sion deadline).220 A plan is accepted if creditors holding a ma-
jority of claims registered with the financial administrator vote
in favor of the plan.221 Secured creditors must agree to plans
proposing that the debtor keep their collateral; otherwise, the
214. Id. art. 213.13. These unique “economic conviction” rules were suppos-
edly designed to reflect international norms of allowing only good faith debt-
ors access to a restructuring process, although I do not recall ever having
seen such provisions in other laws. Explanatory Note, supra note 172, at 3.
215. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.6(8).
216. Id.
217. Id. art. 213.15(1).
218. Certain claims are excluded from modification in a plan, such as per-
sonal injury, alimony, wages, and intellectual property claims. Id. art.
213.14(4). All but the intellectual property claims must be paid in full before
the plan can be confirmed. Id. arts. 213.17(1), 213.27.
219. Id. art. 213.14(2). This is reduction from five years in the original bill.
Explanatory Note, supra note 172, at 4. Also, an accepted plan must include
interest on claims at the Central Bank’s “refinancing rate.” Law 127-FZ, su-
pra note 142, art. 213.19(2).
220. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.12(5). Creditors can participate
remotely, including by electronic means, if the financial administrator allows
it. Id. art. 213.8(1)–(11).
221. Id. arts. 12(3), 15, 213.16. Those voting against the plan must receive
treatment no worse than those voting in favor, id. art. 213.14(3), and any
creditor receiving a disproportionately smaller percentage payout must spe-
cifically vote in favor of the plan, id. art. 213.14(5).
698 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
collateral must be sold.222 An accepted plan must still be con-
firmed by the commercial court for compliance with the law.223
If the requisite majority of creditors does not support a plan,
the court can impose the plan on creditors nonetheless under
limited circumstances (in common parlance, a “cram-down”).
Such a plan must propose full payment of secured creditors and
at least 50 percent payment to unsecured creditors, and this
payment must be “substantially more” than creditors would
receive if the proceeds of liquidation of the debtor’s assets and
six months of nonexempt income were distributed to credi-
tors.224
An accepted plan can be modified (for better or worse) upon
the request of either the debtor or the meeting of creditors, and
the debtor has a duty to notify creditors in writing of “material
modifications” in their financial situation.225 If the debtor fails
to fulfill the terms of a confirmed restructuring plan, the court
can set aside the plan and commence bankruptcy proceedings
only if the meeting of creditors (or an individual creditor) re-
quests that the debtor be declared bankrupt and liquidation
proceedings be commenced.226
c. Bankruptcy and Asset Liquidation/Collection/Distribution
If no plan is timely submitted by either the debtor or a credi-
tor,227 or if the meeting of creditors rejects a proposed plan, the
court will declare the debtor bankrupt and order the com-
222. Id. arts. 18.1(5), 213.10(3). Oddly, another provision allows a secured
creditor who voted against the plan to request permission to seize collateral,
but not if the debtor shows that foreclosure would interfere with fulfillment of
the plan. Id. art. 213.10(2). These provisions were added in the legislative
revision process and appear to be inconsistent: either secured creditors must
agree to a plan in which the debtor retains collateral, or they are allowed to
seek relief from such a plan they opposed, but both cannot be true.
223. Id. arts. 213.17–.18.
224. Id. art. 213.17(4). The court can also grant a creditor’s request to re-
turn the parties to the plan-bargaining table for up to another two months,
though in that case, the maximum plan length cannot exceed two years. Id.
arts. 213.14(2), 213.17(2).
225. Id. arts. 213.19(1), 213.20–.21.
226. Id. arts. 213.22–.23.
227. In such case, the financial administrator curiously still has go through
the formalism of presenting to the meeting of creditors a proposal to request
that the debtor be declared bankrupt. Id. art. 213.12(4), (6).
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mencement of liquidation proceedings.228 Liquidation proceed-
ings extend over a six-month period, during which all of the
debtor’s nonexempt assets, including income received during
that period, are collected and liquidated by the financial ad-
ministrator.229 The six-month period can be extended upon re-
quest of a participant in the case, but the law provides no spe-
cific basis upon which to grant such a request.230 It is not im-
mediately clear from the law that income is included in this
expropriation process, but it follows from provisions requiring
the debtor to turn over all bank cards231 (since that is how
many if not most Russians receive official salary and benefit
payments232) and forbidding any third party from transferring
money or other property to the debtor; rather, directing that
such transfers be made to the financial administrator.233
Several enumerated items of property are excluded from the
bankruptcy estate and reserved for the debtor. Standard prop-
erty exemptions law applies in bankruptcy proceedings,234 and
these protections are broadly in line with European standards,
though Russia has a notably generous (and controversial) ex-
emption for housing.235 Home ownership is quite widespread in
Russia thanks to the housing privatization process.236 Home-
owners’ property rights are generously protected by an unlim-
ited exemption for “residential premises” (and the land under-
lying it) if it is the only one owned by the debtor that is suitable
228. Id. art. 213.24(1)–(2).
229. Id. arts. 213.24(2), 213.25–.26. The court may prohibit the debtor from
leaving the country during this liquidation period. Id. art. 213.24(3).
230. Id. art. 213.24(2).
231. Id. art. 213.25(9).
232. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
233. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.25(7).
234. Id. art. 213.25(3).
235. GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Civil
Procedural Code] [GPK RF] art. 446; Federal’nyi zakon ob ispolnetel’nom
proizvodstve ot 02.10.2007 N. 229-FZ [Federal Law on Execution Process of
Oct. 2, 2007, No. 229-FZ] arts. 99, 101,
http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ispolproisv/.
236. See MASHKINA ET AL., supra note 29, at 2; EUROPEAN MORTG. FED.,
HYPOSTAT 2013: A REVIEW OF EUROPE’SMORTGAGE ANDHOUSINGMARKETS 101
tbl. 18 (2013),
http://www.hypo.org/PortalDev/Objects/6/Files/HYPOSTAT_2013.pdf (noting
an 84 percent owner-occupied rate in 2010).
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for permanent habitation.237 The Constitutional Court has re-
peatedly held that this exemption, unlimited in size or value, is
unconstitutional, as it is improperly broad, imbalanced in favor
of debtors, and a violation of creditors’ rights,238 but the legisla-
ture has consistently ignored these challenges.
Russian law also protects the debtor’s personal property,
such as ordinary household items and clothing, tools and items
necessary for the debtor’s profession or trade (up to a value
ceiling of one hundred times the minimum monthly wage),
noncommercial farm animals and feed, fuel and food, and nec-
essary “means of transportation.”239 The most important per-
sonal property exemption for most debtors is not for hard as-
sets, but for ongoing income (salary and wages), which is pro-
tected up to a subsistence minimum level for the debtor and
each dependent, revised quarterly (in the first quarter of 2015,
about 10,000 rubles per month per adult).240
If the value of the debtor’s assets and/or income exceeds these
protected thresholds, their value is distributed to creditors in a
prescribed order of priority. Expenses of case administration
and debts arising during the administration of the case must
be paid first, most notably the financial administrator’s 2 per-
cent fee,241 as well as (in order of priority) family support debts,
debts for wages and vacation pay for laborers working for the
debtor (though such debts are unlikely to occur in this context
with any frequency), and debts for (communal) housing and
237. GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Civil
Procedural Code] [GPK RF] art. 446.
238. See Postanovleniye Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 14 maya 2012 g. N
11-P, ROS.GAZ. (May 30, 2012), http://www.rg.ru/2012/05/30/sud-dok.html;
Postanovleniye Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 12 iyulya
2007 g. N 10-P, ROS. GAZ. (July 21, 2007),
http://www.rg.ru/2007/07/21/bezmenov-kalabun.html. One wonders whether
the Constitutional Court will find the discharge provisions of the new person-
al bankruptcy law unconstitutional in light of the tenor of these rulings.
239. GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Civil
Procedural Code] [GPK RF], art. 446.
240. Id. The subsistence minimum income is announced quarterly by Gov-
ernment Resolution (Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva) and is based on changes in
the consumer price index, and the specific amount varies depending on the
nature of the individual (worker or pensioner, child or adult). See Velichina
Prozhitochnogo Minimuma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, KONSULTANT PLYUS,
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=33936.
241. Law 127-FZ RF, supra note 142, arts. 20.6(3), (17), 213.9(3)–(4).
2016] Russian Personal Insolvency Law 701
services.242 As for precommencement debts, personal injury and
family support debts have top priority, followed by labor claims
(again, likely uncommon).243 Payment to secured creditors from
the proceeds of liquidation of collateral is subject to a compli-
cated carve out, which reserves 10 percent of those proceeds for
payment of priority and general unsecured creditors.244 The
statute reserves this amount even if the secured creditor’s
claims are never satisfied in full (as well as up 10 percent for
unsatisfied case administration expenses).245 All other creditors
are paid ratably from any remaining funds.
d. Discharge and Debtor Restrictions
Claims that are not fully satisfied by the liquidation proceeds
“are considered paid.”246 That is, the debtor “is freed from fur-
ther fulfillment of creditor demands,” including those of un-
known creditors and creditors not participating in the proceed-
ings.247 The list of debts that are excepted from this discharge
is quite limited, encompassing only the priority claims dis-
cussed immediately above, along with claims for the term-of-
art concept “moral harm,” for reckless or intentional property
242. Id. arts. 5, 213.27(1)–(2).
243. Id. art. 213.27(3).
244. Id. art. 213.27(5).
245. Id.
246. Id. art. 213.27(6).
247. Id. art. 213.28(3). The debtor can be denied a discharge for defined and
established administrative infractions (e.g., concealing property, impeding
the administrator) during the bankruptcy case or for fraudulent or intention-
al bankruptcy, both carefully defined terms of art. Id. art. 213.28(4); KODEKS
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII OB ADMINISTRATIVNYX PRAVONARUSHENIYAX [KOAP RF]
[Code of Administrative Violations] art. 14.12–.13. A new provision added in
the legislative revision process also denies a discharge to debtors who “mali-
ciously avoided paying credit obligations” or taxes, obtained credit through
fraud, or hid or intentionally destroyed property. Law 127-FZ, supra note
142, art. 213.28(4). The first, quoted portion is potentially troubling, but a
similar provision has long been present in the Criminal Code, and few if any
prosecutions have occurred under that provision, so perhaps this is simply a
matter of parallelism that will have no practical effect. See Igor Gerasimov,
“Nikakix mer vozdeistviya, krome lasckovyx ugovorov”, KOMMERS. (June 3,
2015), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2738706 (quoting Anna Konyaeva stat-
ing, “Malicious debtors, intentionally evading satisfaction of debts, are not
subjected to criminal liability, though such a statute exists—177 [Criminal
Code RF] ‘malicious avoidance of satisfaction of indebtedness to creditors.’”).
702 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
damage, and subsidiary liability of controlling persons for caus-
ing the bankruptcy of a company.248
Along with the benefit of a discharge, however, come a few
restrictions designed “for the protection of the stability of the
banking system and economic activity generally.”249 First, for
the five years following the conclusion of either procedure, the
debtor must disclose a restructuring plan or bankruptcy when-
ever seeking credit.250 Second, during that same five years, the
debtor cannot initiate another bankruptcy case.251 Finally, for
the three years following the conclusion of a bankruptcy case,
the debtor is prohibited from acting in a directorial capacity in
any company,252 and an individual entrepreneur loses his or
her entrepreneurial registration and cannot engage in entre-
preneurial activity (or act in a directorial capacity in any com-
pany) for five years following the conclusion of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.253
2. Evaluation: An Elegant System with a Few Quirks and Chal-
lenges
So how does the new Russian personal bankruptcy system
stand up to the international best practices discussed above?254
Relatively well, though of course not without a few potential
points of friction. The results of this new system will likely not
be precisely what many lawmakers either expected or desired
(especially in terms of restructuring agreements), but if a few
key stumbling blocks are overcome, this will be a well-
structured process largely worth emulating. In particular, ad-
ministrative capacity problems threaten to weigh heavily on
this new system, though the commercial courts seem to be mov-
ing in the right direction to streamline their operations and
overcome these concerns.
248. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 213.28(5)–(6).
249. Explanatory Note, supra note 172, at 4.
250. Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, arts. 213.19(3), 213.30(1).
251. Id. art. 213.30(2).
252. Id. art. 213.30(3).
253. Id. art. 216.
254. See supra Part II.
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a. Discharge With Few Exceptions
On the most important characteristic, discharge, the new
Russian law clearly establishes its “two steps forward, one step
back” approach. The law takes two steps forward by finally ex-
tending a discharge of unsustainable debt for nonentrepreneur
individuals, subject to only a very few common and narrow ex-
ceptions.255 The post-bankruptcy restrictions, however, repre-
sent a significant step back.
Post-bankruptcy restrictions are disfavored in modern policy,
especially when applied without regard to the debtor’s honesty
or lack thereof.256 The post-bankruptcy obligation to disclose a
previous bankruptcy when obtaining credit, while little more
than an incident of an underdeveloped credit-reporting system,
is symbolic of this disfavored historical perspective. More coun-
terproductive is the five-year restriction on entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. It will either dissuade active debtors from seeking debt
relief who need it, or prevent the full enjoyment of the “fresh
start” for both entrepreneurs and the state, both of whom stand
to gain from more, not less, entrepreneurial risk-taking. The
blanket, five-year restriction on entrepreneurialism runs di-
rectly counter to the general European “second chance” policy
and the EU Commission’s recommendations on limiting such
disabilities to fraudulent or dishonest debtors.257
b. Open and Low-Cost Access
On the second group of factors, the Russian law is also fairly
consistent with European standards and strikes a balance be-
tween offering relief and averting abuse. The two main access
limitations are cost and the “insolvency” criterion, both of
which will bar access for some “honest but unfortunate” debt-
ors, but hopefully to a fairly limited degree. As for cost, legisla-
tors carefully limited the official costs to debtors by instituting
an online electronic register for filings and announcements and
restricting the financial administrator’s fee to a one-time pay-
ment of 10,000 rubles.258 Amounting to no more than about
255. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.
256. See LAW REFORM COMM’N, PERSONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AND DEBT
ENFORCEMENT ¶¶ 3.95–.110 (2010),
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/r100Debt.pdf.
257. Id.
258. See supra note 204–05 and accompanying text.
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two-thirds of the national average monthly salary, or $1000
USD in purchasing-power-parity terms,259 the total fees for any
given personal bankruptcy case seem fairly modest, though
they will deter some lower-income debtors. A greater deterrent
will likely be the cost for an attorney to assist the debtor in
preparing the petition and schedules, in addition to a restruc-
turing plan if that route is elected. Doubling or tripling the offi-
cial cost burden,260 lawyer fees could render many debtors “too
poor to be bankrupt,” but this is a conundrum that debtors in
other systems have overcome successfully (such as by diverting
money to lawyers and bankruptcy fees that would otherwise be
given to creditors, since unpaid balances will be discharge in a
successful bankruptcy proceeding).261 Overall, the cost barrier
to access in the Russian system is not insubstantial, but nei-
ther is it shockingly overwhelming.
The “insolvency” entry criterion is presented in much the
same way as in other European personal insolvency laws, so
the law “on the books” is heartening. The Russian law admira-
bly eschews the pre-Revolutionary approach262 of requiring a
probing examination of the debtor’s morality or deservingness
or the reasons for the debtor’s predicament. The insolvency cri-
terion is drafted in a nonjudgmental way that requires some
subjective evaluation but is still cabined by objective indicators.
A final evaluation will have to await a demonstration of the
law “in action,” however, as the courts put a Russian spin on
what it means for debtors to demonstrate circumstances “obvi-
ously” showing that they are “not in a condition” to pay their
debts, and that this condition will not be relieved in a “not ex-
259. See supra note 185 for a description of average salary and PPP conver-
sion rates applied here.
260. Lawyer fees in Russia seem to be in line with fees for personal bank-
ruptcy cases in the United States, and like their U.S. counterparts, many
Russian debtors will likely attempt to avoid attorney’s fees by electing to pur-
sue their cases pro se, despite the substantially increased likelihood of dis-
missal for various errors and failures. See generally LOIS R. LUPICA, THE
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY FEE STUDY: FINAL REPORT (2011),
http://www.abi.org/member-resources/law-review/the-consumer-bankruptcy-
fee-study-final-report.
261. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bank-
ruptcy, 98 GA. LAW J. 289, 318–24 (2010) (describing several strategies used
by debtors to accumulate attorneys’ and filing fees in the United States).
262. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
2016] Russian Personal Insolvency Law 705
tended period of time.”263 The objective presumptions written
into the law will help ease this analysis, but it will be up to the
courts to apply the law in a way that either broadens or nar-
rows the entry portal to this new system. Though the law con-
strains judicial discretion in large part, the operative language
still leaves room for significant divergences in approach or a
restrictive and unproductive interpretation of legislative in-
tent.
Just as important as the presence of good approaches is the
notable absence of a particularly bad one: The statute does not
require Russian debtors to negotiate relief from their creditors
in an informal process as a prerequisite to entry into the formal
relief system. This largely pointless exercise in futility has
caused serious problems in many other European personal in-
solvency regimes,264 and it is laudable that Russian lawmakers
did not impose this common requirement on debtors. The ab-
sence of an established network of consumer debt counselors
may have forced lawmakers’ hands here,265 but for whatever
reason, allowing insolvent debtors direct access to a structured,
formal process is an evolving best practice. That is not to say
that the Russian law leaves no room for negotiation with credi-
tors; it does this, however, in a controlled environment where
the financial administrator and the court can potentially exert
some positive influence, in the first of the two-stage creditor
satisfaction process.
c. Creditor Satisfaction
On the third characteristic of personal insolvency laws, the
result in most cases under the new Russian law will likely fall
very much in line with European standards. Uniform, and
therefore more equitable, treatment of all debtors is embedded
in the core operating procedure, avoiding problems of discre-
tionary inequalities and wasted time crafting zero-payment
plans. The Russian procedure is more streamlined and efficient
in several key ways, perhaps marking a movement toward a
263. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
264. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 25–28.
265. A similar reason may explain the absence of a required pre-bankruptcy
negotiation in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and much of Eastern and
Southern Europe. See Kilborn, supra note 55, at 168–69; see KILBORN, supra
note 57, at 25.
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more rational approach to personal bankruptcy in Europe. That
being said, this factor contains a few spots of potentially seri-
ous trouble, depending upon how the process plays out on the
ground, especially with respect to home mortgages.
i. Restructuring Plans: A Dream Not Come True
Debtors have their chance to negotiate a restructuring with
creditors at the very beginning of the formal process. The pan-
European preference for negotiated solutions finds its expres-
sion here, buttressed by the court’s ability to impose a best-
efforts plan on irrationally recalcitrant creditors.266 After a
neutral and disinterested court has examined the debtor’s fi-
nances and established “insolvency,” creditors ought to be
primed to consider a compromise arrangement, especially if a
discharge of their claims lies on the other side of their negotiat-
ing line in the sand. In theory, this first stage of facilitating
maximal creditor satisfaction reflects best practices.
In reality, despite lawmakers’ emphasis that this entire pro-
cess serve primarily as a platform for facilitating restructuring
agreements, successful restructuring plans will most likely be a
fleeting fantasy. Decades of experience in Europe have shown
that most individual debtors lack the capacity to offer their
creditors anything close to what is necessary to strike an ac-
ceptable restructuring deal, especially when the timetable is
limited to three years.267 It is not surprising that restructuring
plans are commonplace in business reorganization proceedings,
while they are the rare exception in personal bankruptcy cases.
Artificial business entities can credibly promise much better
returns (often involving very large values) if the business is al-
lowed to continue, and these enticements are often supported
by professional advisors and are burdened by very little moral
baggage in the dog-eat-dog world of business.268
In contrast, individual debtors generally have little to offer on
low-value debts with their limited future earning capacity. And
266. See supra notes 219–24 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Jason J. Kilborn, The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform: Danger Signs for the New U.S. Law from Unexpected Parallels in the
Netherlands, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 90–91 (2006) (reporting on a
study of credit counselling, suggesting a threshold for successful restructur-
ing plans of at least 40–50 percent payment on creditor claims); KILBORN,
supra note 57, at 46–47; World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 298, 300, 313.
268. See, e.g.,World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 50, 210–11.
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in the personal context, value-maximizing economic rationali-
zation is often pushed aside as creditors take an emotionally
driven, judgmental stance toward debtors’ failure to “live up to
their promises.”269 Russian experts have long predicted that
creditors will be generally unwilling to agree to restructuring
plans for individual debtors.270 If legislators hoped that indi-
vidual debtors would be able to overcome these obstacles and
reach compromise agreements with creditors, those hopes are
destined to be dashed.
It is particularly odd that the Russian law invites creditors
not only to evaluate restructuring plans, but also to submit
them.271 Given the low values (and, for some institutional cred-
itors, high volume) of these individual cases, creditors have
very little incentive in most cases to spend time considering a
plan, much less crafting one that the debtor might or might not
agree to and/or fulfill—the debtor already defaulted, after all—
and other creditors will have to agree to the plan and accept its
benefits as free-riders. This is just not a cost-effective approach
for creditors. In international practice today, it is an extreme
rarity that creditors participate at all in the formulation of re-
structuring plans.272 Creditors have every reason to prefer a
quick bankruptcy liquidation and distribution, write-off of the
unpaid debt, and clean balance sheet, not throwing good money
(and time) after bad.
It is somewhat ironic that the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment supported its original proposal by naming Sweden
among one of the three explicitly identified countries with
“sufficiently successful mechanisms” of personal debt re-
lief.273 Sweden learned the bitter lesson of deferring to creditor
voting on personal debt restructuring plans. Even in cases
where a plan had been proposed by the government debt collec-
tion agency, applying standard criteria, many creditors refused
in principal to accept such compromises.274 The Swedish re-
269. Id. ¶ 66.
270. See, e.g., “Fiziki” smogut bankrotit’sya, supra note 155.
271. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g.,World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 209, 212.
273. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
274. See Jason J. Kilborn, Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden
Aggressively Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Re-
formers Fallen Off the Learning Curve?, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 460 (2007)
[hereinafter Kilborn, Out with the New]. Irish lawmakers have confronted
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sponse to this problem was decisive: In 2007, after thirteen
years of experience under one of the earliest European personal
insolvency laws, Swedish lawmakers scrapped all efforts to en-
gage creditors in restructuring plan negotiations, in favor of
simply imposing statutory best-efforts plans on them.275
Yet Russian legislators have just oriented their new system
down this same path to demonstrated failure. To its credit, the
Russian procedure contains a “cram-down” procedure to over-
come irrational creditor resistance,276 but its application will be
extremely limited, at best. Few if any debtors who qualify as
“insolvent” will be able to pay secured debt in full and unse-
cured creditors the statutory minimum 50 percent owed to
them (with interest) within three years, while also supporting
their families.
Eventually, personal bankruptcy cases might well sort them-
selves into “mildly insolvent” and “hopelessly insolvent,” with
the former group proposing and confirming restructuring
plans. The regimes in France and the Netherlands offer exam-
ples of such a nicely divided model, but they both have some-
thing crucial that the Russian regime lacks: a trusted and in-
fluential coordinating institution than can aggressively negoti-
ate with creditors.277 In France, the central bank has been in-
strumental in goading creditors into agreeing to workout plans,
and it runs an elaborate network of commissions throughout
the country to process individual cases.278 In the Netherlands, a
respectable rate of plan confirmation has been achieved only
thanks to the concerted efforts of a carefully coordinated credit-
counseling industry.279 Russia lacks either of these institutions
similar attitudes among prominent banks with respect to the reformed Irish
personal insolvency scheme. See Jason Kilborn, Banks Fighting New Irish
Insolvency Service Before It Starts, CREDIT SLIPS BLOG (Sept. 4, 2013, 9:56
AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/09/banks-fighting-new-irish-
insolvency-service-before-it-starts.html.
275. See Kilborn, Out with the New, supra note 274, at 457–61.
276. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g.,World Bank, supra note 60, ¶ 136.
278. See Jason J. Kilborn, La Responsabilisation de l’Economie: What the
United States Can Learn from the New French Law on Consumer Overindebt-
edness, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 619, 635–40, 645–46 (2005).
279. See Kilborn, supra note 267, at 87–88; Jason J. Kilborn, Still Chasing
Chimeras but Finally Slaying Some Dragons in the Quest for Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2012).
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or any other indicator of likely personal debt restructuring suc-
cess.
Indeed, Russia’s own experience over more than a decade
with settlement plans in the context of individual entrepre-
neurs’ bankruptcies provides ample evidence of the futility of
hoping for negotiated solutions. At any point in the bankruptcy
process, proceedings can be terminated by the conclusion of a
settlement agreement with creditors.280 For individual entre-
preneurs, this option has been for many years the functional
equivalent of the restructuring plan envisioned for individual
debtors in stage one of the new personal bankruptcy law.281 For
individual entrepreneurs, who likely have greater resources at
their disposal than the average nonmerchant individual, how
often have debtors been able to work something out with their
creditors and put an end to their bankruptcy cases? According
to court statistics, not frequently: In 2014, the commercial
courts closed 26,264 bankruptcy cases.282 Of these, 598—2 per-
cent—were closed upon conclusion of a settlement agreement
(mirovoe soglashenie).283 Results were similar in each of the
preceding four years, with settlements actually rising from just
0.8 percent of all closed cases in 2010 to a high of 2.5 percent in
2013.284 These statistics aggregate business and individual cas-
es, so it is not possible to know what percentage of these few
settlements arose in cases involving individual entrepreneurs
rather than companies—it could be that settlements are more
common in cases involving individuals, though the opposite
seems much more likely.
Two further pieces of evidence suggest that agreed workouts
will be rare in personal bankruptcy cases. First, in the devel-
280. See supra note 213.
281. See Kirill Gorbatov, Dolzhen ne budesh’, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA (June 9,
2015, 12:40 AM), http://www.rg.ru/2015/06/09/bankroty.html (making this
comparison).
282. Otchyot o rabote arbitrazhnyx sudov sub’’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po
rasmotreniyu del o bankrotstve 2014 tbl. 1 (2015), SUDEBNYY DEPARTAMENT
http://www.cdep.ru/userimages/sudebnaya_statistika/2014/Otchet_o_rabote_a
rbitragnih_sudov_subektov_RF_po_delam_o_bankrotstve.xls.
283. Id.
284. Svedeniya o rassmotrenii arbitrazhnymi sudami Rossiiskoi Federatsii
del o nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrotstve) v 2010-2013 gg., FEDERAL’NYYE
ARBITRAZHNYYE SUDY ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII (2013),
http://www.arbitr.ru/_upimg/A0397A1AFD76C6B4E3082E213B98BB5D_11.p
df.
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opment of a bill to formalize the new unofficial office of Finan-
cial Ombudsman,285 banks opposed a provision requiring them
to comply with the Ombudsman’s proposals for restructuring
unsustainable personal debts.286 The Financial Ombudsman
position was designed and implemented by banks to be a neu-
tral mediator between them and individual debtors.287 If the
banks are unwilling to accept restructuring proposals from
within their own tailor-made structure, the chances seem quite
slim that they will accept proposals from unsupported individ-
ual debtors. Second, based on recent experience with repre-
sented debtors, one bankruptcy advisor is already comforting
potential clients by suggesting that most debtors will have in-
sufficient incentive or ability to seek a restructuring in person-
al bankruptcy cases, mostly due to lack of sufficient income.288
So much for stage one. Given the incentives and practical re-
alities in most personal bankruptcy cases, neither the debtor
nor any creditor will submit a restructuring plan, and after a
statutory two-month delay, the lion’s share of cases will pro-
ceed immediately to stage two, liquidation bankruptcy.
ii. Bankruptcy: The Hidden Payment Plan . . . and Hidden In-
come
Though the explicit focus of the bankruptcy stage is on collec-
tion and liquidation of the debtor’s hard assets, this stage actu-
ally resembles the standard European “earned start” with a
payment plan, as well. Because the process lasts six months by
statute, and all of the debtor’s property acquired during this
period becomes part of the estate, turnover of a limited portion
of future income is clearly part of the bargain with creditors in
exchange for the discharge. Legal protections for a minimum
modicum of property and income ensure debtors’ dignified ex-
istence during and after bankruptcy, and again to the credit of
Russian lawmakers, these protections are largely equal and
285. See supra note 181.
286. Irina Badmaeva, Osen’yu v Rossii poyavitsya finansovyi, MK (July 9,
2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.mk.ru/economics/2015/07/09/osenyu-v-rossii-
poyavitsya-finansovyy-ombudsmen.html.
287. See supra note 181.
288. See Protsedura bankrotstva fizicheskogo litsa, BANKROT KONSALT,
http://2lex.ru/bankrotstvo-fizicheskih-lits/procedura-bankrotstva-fiziceskogo-
lica (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (reporting that 99 percent of clients likely will
not file a restructuring plan due to low or no income).
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predictable across the country. Other European regimes have
struggled with assigning discretion to a court or other adminis-
trator to decide how much of the debtor’s future income to re-
serve for family support.289 By relying on the minimum income
standard, which is revised quarterly, Russian legislators have
all but excluded discretion and unequal treatment from this
aspect of the system.
Whether 10,000 rubles per month is an appropriate standard
for dignified existence is another question, but this period of
privation is mercifully and uniquely limited. Six months of
surplus income (or at least life on subsistence income, if no
surplus is available) is a comparatively small price to pay for a
discharge of debt. In this way the Russian law pursues the goal
of creditor satisfaction a bit less aggressively than other Euro-
pean laws, which subject debtors to three to five or even more
years on minimum budgets.290 This six-month period, however,
is actually a nice compromise between the waste inherent in
extended and often fruitless European payment plans, on the
one hand, and value left on the table in a U.S.-style get-out-of-
jail-free asset-only liquidation, on the other hand. It is mildly
concerning that the court is assigned discretion to lengthen
this period, with no indication of the criteria or ultimate lim-
it for such an extension,291 but one hopes that courts will ap-
ply this provision sparingly and judiciously. The shorter income
expropriation period makes Russian bankruptcy somewhat like
a visit to the public bath (banya): Debtors jump in the ice bath
for only a short time before returning to the steam room for re-
juvenated health, then on to the lounge for beer and vobla.292
The Russian national pastime of hiding income from taxing
authorities may complicate the creditor recovery goal here. A
strikingly consistent over time one-third of Russians report
that they (and their employers) evade tax by concealing part or
even all of their income by receiving it “in an envelope” rather
than paid through normal channels.293 Salary distributed via
289. SeeWorld Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 284–89.
290. See KILBORN, supra note 57, at 49–53.
291. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
292. See Pro pivo i voblu, ZOLOTAYA VOBLA, http://www.vobla.ru/o-pive (last
visited Apr. 9, 2016).
293. See GUSEVA, supra note 5, at 108; VTsIOM vyyasnil, chto pochti ka-
zhdyi tretii rossiyanin poluchaet zarplatu v konverte, DP (Apr. 14, 2015, 12:37
PM), http://www.dp.ru/a/2015/04/14/VCIOM_vijasnil_chto_kazhdij/ (reporting
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plastic card can be intercepted quite easily by the financial
administrator; salary distributed in cash in an envelope is
harder to seize. Public acceptance of this new regime may be
undermined if debtors are perceived as taking undue ad-
vantage by accepting the statutory minimum income officially,
but concealing significant excess income. There is no easy or
obvious solution to this problem; some degree of inappropriate
behavior by some debtors is simply inevitable. As the World
Bank has observed, “perfect exclusion of fraud is not an achiev-
able goal” and “[c]are should be taken to avoid sacrificing the
great good of such a system simply because perfection cannot
be assured.”294
A larger potential problem here concerns secured collateral,
especially home mortgages. For many, and perhaps most, debt-
ors, their home will be protected by the complete exemption of
the value of the debtor’s only suitable residence.295 The finan-
cial administrator will be prohibited from seizing such proper-
ty, and debtors will retain their homes. For the limited number
of debtors with home mortgages, however, the law creates a
unique perverse incentive for the financial administrator to
undermine both the rights of the mortgage creditor and the
debtor in property subject to a mortgage (or other security in-
terest, in the case of movable assets). If the value of the home
(or other collateral) were reserved exclusively for the secured
creditor, as it is in most bankruptcy systems in the world,296
on a survey by national opinion pollster, VTsIOM, which found that 28 per-
cent of Russians received unreported income from employers “in envelopes,”
13 percent concealed all of their income in this way and paid no taxes, while
15 percent concealed and evaded tax on only part of their income); Pochti tret’
rossiyan poluchayut zarplatu v konvertax, VDVS (Oct. 11, 2006, 10:18 AM),
http://news.vdv-s.ru/society/?news=10059 (reporting on earlier VTsIOM sur-
vey finding 27 percent concealed income received “in an envelope,” 9 percent
concealing all of their income, 18 percent concealing only part); see also V
Rossii predlozhili za zarplaty v konvertax sazhat’ na tri goda, KUBAN24 (July
17, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://kuban24.tv/item/v-rossii-predlojili-za-zarplatyi-v-
konvertah-sajat-na-tri-goda-123262 (reporting on a legislative initiative to
combat employers’ concealing employees’ income “in envelopes,” a problem
that the bill’s sponsors estimated occurs, at least to a certain degree, in 50
percent of wage payments).
294. World Bank, supra note 60, ¶¶ 115, 119.
295. See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., RANKING AND PRIORITY OF CREDITORS (Dennis Faber et. al,
eds., 2016) (responding to the General Outline question on “Ranking of insol-
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debtors might preserve their homes post-bankruptcy by negoti-
ating some arrangement with their mortgagees.297
In both corporate298 and personal299 bankruptcy cases in Rus-
sia, however, secured claims are subject to a unique carve-out
that reserves 10 percent of the value of homes and other se-
cured collateral for payment of unsecured claims (along with 10
percent for payment of unsatisfied case administration expens-
es). Financial administrators thus have an incentive in any
case of a mortgaged property to sell the property in bankruptcy
proceedings, distribute 10 percent of its value to unsecured
creditors, and pocket a 2 percent commission on at least the
amount distributed to unsecured creditors, if not the entire
value of the liquidated property (since the other 80 percent is
distributed by the administrator, as well, to the secured credi-
tor).300 As for the debtor’s interest, the total exemption in the
value of the debtor’s only suitable home is not applicable to
property encumbered by a mortgage.301 If financial administra-
tors use liquidation proceedings to extract value from mort-
gaged property in this way, expelling debtors from their mort-
gaged homes and undermining secured creditors’ rights, the
legislative intention will quite clearly have been frustrated.
This will be one of the most sensitive questions of interpreta-
tion facing the courts in the first years of implementing the
new law.
d. Institutional Capacity: Will Corners Be Squared . . . or Cut?
Whether or not this new system works well, roots out abuse,
and ultimately delivers needed relief depends, in the final
analysis, on one factor: the capacity of the courts and financial
administrators, the two main administrative institutions, to
vency claims” on whether secured creditors have priority in collateral value
or are subject to a carve-out).
297. If the value of the property exceeds the loan secured by mortgage, the
debtor’s exemption in that value might protect it; otherwise, that free value
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate subject to liquidation and distribution.
298. See Law 127-FZ, supra note 142, art. 138.
299. Id. art 213.27(5); see supra note 244.
300. See supra note 204.
301. GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Civil
Procedural Code] [GPK RF] art. 446. It is not clear how the law treats par-
tially encumbered homes, with value in excess of any mortgage. One would
expect the courts to protect that value for debtors in light of the full exemp-
tion.
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fulfill their tasks efficiently and effectively. Given the current
limitations of and anticipated burdens on these two institu-
tions, the expected volume of consumer bankruptcy cases raises
cause for concern. At least in the beginning, if not thereafter,
one of three things will likely happen: (1) efficiencies will de-
velop to cut through needless formalism and square corners, (2)
corners will be cut, or (3) the system will bog down and grind to
a near standstill under an avalanche of cases.
i. The Courts
From the very introduction of the Ministry proposal for the
new personal bankruptcy regime, the High Commercial
Court302 warned that the courts would be deluged with up to
204,000 petitions per year,303 requiring 555 more commercial
court judges in the first three years, significant investment in
other personnel (1110 staff positions)—at least 500 million ru-
bles per year, and if debt collection cases were not reduced,
nearly 3 billion rubles in the first three years and 1.5 billion
rubles per year thereafter—as well as for infrastructure for the
commercial courts (6.8 billion rubles for construction).304 It does
302. In a move opposed by most legal experts, the High Commercial Court
was eliminated in mid-2014 pursuant to a surprise initiative by President
Putin, purportedly designed to unify the jurisprudential approach and over-
sight in commercial and civil cases by folding the High Commercial Court
into the Supreme Court. See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Unexpected Demise of
Russia’s High Arbitrazh Court and the Politicization of Judicial Reform, 147
RUSS. ANALYTICAL DIG. 2, 2 (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-147.pdf; Yuliya Sinitsyna,
Ob’’edinenie vysshyx sudov, Chto Delat’ obozrenie, CHTO DELAT’ OBOZRENIYE
(Apr. 2014), http://www.4do.4dk.ru/articles/obedinenie-vysshikh-sudov. The
lower commercial court system will continue to operate, but ultimate appeals
will be heard, and doctrine and policy developed, by the Supreme Court.
303. Others estimated an even higher number, as up to two million Rus-
sians in 2012 had been the subject of unsuccessful debt collection proceed-
ings. Zakliucheniye Obshchestvennoi palaty RF , supra note 175, at 1.
304. Finansovo-ekonomicheskoe obosnovanie k proektu federal’nogo zakona
“O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nii zakon “O nesostoyatel’nosti (bankrot-
stve)” i otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v chasti reguliro-
vaniya reabilitatsionnyx protsedur, primenyaemyx v otnoshenii grazhdanina-
dolzhnika [Financial-Economic Implications of the Draft Bill of a Federal
Law “On the Introduction of Amendments to the Federal Law “On Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regu-
lating Rehabilitation Procedures Applied with Respect to a Citizen-Debtor”]
1–2, in Legislative History, supra note 159.
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not appear that these extra funds have been allocated, or that
there are any plans to do so in the near future.305 As recently as
July 2015, similar entreaties for more personnel and infra-
structure support have been voiced by the Moscow Commercial
Court,306 which likely stands to be most burdened by the new
law.307
Any additional burden on the commercial courts will weigh
heavily, as they are already substantially overburdened. The
commercial courts handle a wide variety of economic disputes
involving legal entities (including shareholder lawsuits) and
individual entrepreneurs, as well as all bankruptcy cases.308
The average caseload for a commercial court judge is about six-
ty matters per month, and the Moscow judges carry a stagger-
ing load of around two hundred cases per month.309 Despite
these burdens, these judges are relentlessly driven by schedul-
ing deadlines.310 One commentator notes “a bizarre obsession
with time on the part of [commercial court] judges,”311 and “the
obsession of these judges with getting cases handled within the
statutory deadlines.”312 Especially in light of the case burdens
305. This has been a steady trend for years, with the Chairman of the High
Commercial Court requesting greater funding in meetings with President
Putin, followed by rhetorical acknowledgment of the burden, but no addition-
al funding. See Hendley, supra note 195, at 261.
306. See Arbitrazh Moskvy dlya iskov o bankrotstve fizlits prosit dopfinansi-
rovanie, RAPSINEWS (July 15, 2015, 5:57 PM),
http://rapsinews.ru/arbitration/20150715/274148628.html.
307. For a comparison of the relative weight of caseloads on the various
commercial courts, illustrating the disproportionate share falling on the Mos-
cow City commercial court, see Hendley, supra note 195, at 246 tbl. 3.
308. See Kathryn Hendley, Judges as Gatekeepers to Mediation: The Rus-
sian Case, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 423, 429 (2015). For a fascinating
and rare insight into the operation of the commercial courts and the incen-
tives of litigants (especially creditors) to use them, see Kathryn Hendley,
Business Litigation in the Transition: A Portrait of Debt Collection in Russia,
38 L. & SOC’YREV. 305 (2004).
309. See Rukovodstvo ASGM rasskazalo o roste nagruzki, ocheredyax i pod-
gotovke k bankrotstvu fizlits, PRAVO.RU (July 15, 2015, 4:40 PM),
http://pravo.ru/court_report/view/120336; Interv’yu eksperta po bankrotstvu
grazhdan, ASSOTSIATSIYA PODDERZHKI FIZICHESKIKH LITS PRI BANKROTSTVE (Ju-
ly 2, 2015), http://bankrot127.ru/news/11002.html.
310. See Hendley, supra note 195, at 261; see also supra note 209 and ac-
companying text.
311. Hendley, supra note 195, at 260.
312. Id. at 253.
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they bear, the commercial courts have an extraordinary track
record of meeting their statutory case deadlines.313
An inundation of new personal bankruptcy cases may well
press the courts past their capacity for heroic observance of
time limits. Leaders of the Moscow City commercial court have
expressed confidence that they will be able to continue to meet
statutory deadlines even in the face of an onslaught of new per-
sonal bankruptcy cases,314 but at what cost? If the conveyor belt
does not slow down, operations on the much greater number of
units will have to be accelerated, either through a significant
increase in efficiency or in short-cuts of some kind. The com-
mercial courts already seem to be operating above efficient ca-
pacity, so short-cuts are the only remaining option. Commercial
court judges seem to have resigned themselves to the reality of
efficiency-driven trade-offs. A particularly knowledgeable ob-
server describes that “[m]ore than one [commercial court] judge
has bemoaned the ‘conveyor belt’ quality of the justice they are
able to mete out under these circumstances.”315 They have al-
ready been forced to cut corners in the process of opinion writ-
ing.316 Both the conveyor-belt problem and the corner-cutting
problem will be magnified exponentially if the commercial
courts have to contend with hundreds of thousands of personal
bankruptcy petitions each year.
Where will the courts economize? Primarily in the one ruling
that requires their serious attention: the evaluation of debtors’
“insolvency.”317 On this and other matters, judges will likely
face a choice of applying one of two opposing time-saving pre-
sumptions: either most debtors are insolvent and should be
admitted to the procedure (otherwise, why would they subject
themselves to this process and its attendant disabilities?) or
most debtors are solvent and are opportunistically evading
their debts (a common fear among bankers, in particular). Only
if the documentation presented undermines one of these pre-
sumptions will the court make the nonpresumptive ruling; that
313. See id. at 260.
314. See Arbitrazh Moskvy dlya iskov o bankrotstve fizlits prosit dopfinansi-
rovanie, supra note 305; Rukovodstvo ASGM rasskazalo o roste nagruzki,
ocheredyax i podgotovke k bankrotstvu fizlits, supra note 309.
315. Hendley, supra note 195, at 260.
316. Id. (noting that, as a result of time pressures, judges “sometimes cut
corners in their opinion writing”).
317. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
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is, on admission or rejection of the petition. The choice that
commercial court judges as a whole make on this question in
particular will determine, perhaps more than anything else,
whether the system works smoothly or not. If the courts choose
the conservative route, presuming abuse and strictly limiting
access to relief, this will powerfully undermine the legislative
intent behind the law, the international best practice of open
access, and the benefits of a portfolio regime like personal
bankruptcy.
Indeed, one has to wonder why the courts must be involved
here at all. There is nothing especially dispute-oriented about
establishing a debtor’s insolvency and ordering an objective ap-
plication of the liquidation process. An administrative body, not
encumbered by other business, would achieve this perfectly
well, leaving the parties with a right to appeal unfavorable rul-
ings to the courts if they so wished. That is exactly what Swe-
den did in 2007.318 The continued insistence on multiple hear-
ings and court confirmation of undisputed matters319 is a puz-
zling fixation with formalism in a context that demands flexi-
bility and efficiency.
ii. Financial Administrators
In terms of contact time and responsibility for making the
process unfold, the financial administrator plays an arguably
greater role than the court, so capacity constraints would really
hit hard here. Administrators bear a huge amount of responsi-
bility for convening meetings of creditors, collecting and evalu-
ating claims, and analyzing and reporting on the debtor’s fi-
nancial situation and restructuring plan.320 Further, adminis-
trators liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt assets, collect the
debtor’s nonexempt income, and distribute value to creditors.321
Moreover, the financial administrators are the first line of de-
fense against abuse of the system by debtors. If assets are con-
veyed away or otherwise concealed, the financial administrator
318. See Kilborn, Out with the New, supra note 273, at 460–61; see also su-
pra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.
319. A particularly notable example of this is the requirement for a court
hearing upon conclusion of a restructuring plan, even if no one objects and
the debtor has satisfied his or her obligations. See Law 127-FZ, supra note
142, art. 213.22(4)–(5).
320. See id. art. 213.9.
321. Id.
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is responsible for finding and retrieving this value (and oppos-
ing the debtor’s discharge), which could well give rise to one or
more additional lawsuits in the course of any given personal
bankruptcy case.322 Administrators have not only a duty but
also a significant monetary incentive to challenge fraudulent
conveyances, root out concealed value for creditors, and thereby
police the system against abuse—they receive 2 percent of any
recoveries distributed to creditors.323
In the ordinary case, however, which likely will not involve
significant value from either challenged pre-bankruptcy trans-
actions or exempt assets or income, the financial incentives for
all of this work seem rather limited. One wonders whether
qualified administrators will be attracted to this industry for
10,000 rubles per case (about $500 USD). In comparative
terms, trustees in consumer liquidation cases in the United
States earn only about one-tenth this much per case ($60
USD), but there are far fewer of them and therefore likely
greater opportunity to aggregate value through large numbers
of simple cases.324 Without a central regulator in Russia, it will
fall to the SROs325 to ensure that their members take on per-
sonal bankruptcy cases, perhaps in part by equitably allocating
assignments of high-value business cases and low-value con-
sumer cases among their member administrators.
Many new SRO companies are predicted to enter what will be
a rapidly growing personal bankruptcy field in Russia.326 At
least in the large urban concentrations, like Moscow and St.
322. “Suspicious transactions” implemented by the debtor within the previ-
ous one or three years can be declared null and the value returned to the es-
tate (the functional equivalent of constructive and actual fraudulent convey-
ances, respectively, in the United States), along with certain transactions
that prefer one creditor over others during the preceding several months. Id.
arts. 61.2–.3.
323. See supra note 204. The extra 2 percent commission on value distrib-
uted to creditors exacerbates the problem of mortgaged property, however,
discussed above. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
324. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(b) (designating $60 from the filing fee for each con-
sumer bankruptcy case for the trustee); Who is a Chapter 7 Panel Trustee,
Bankruptcy FAQ, NAT’L ASS’N BANKR. TRUSTEES,
http://www.nabt.com/faq.cfm#Q5 (last visited Mar. 19, 2016) (reporting a to-
tal of 1000 panel trustees managing over one million consumer filings annu-
ally).
325. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
326. See Artyom Aldanov, Fizlits po oseni schitayut, KOMMERS. (July 27,
2015), http://kommersant.ru/doc/2774302.
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Petersburg, significant competition may well develop among
these SROs to get debtors to nominate them to choose case ad-
ministrators from among their members.327 How this competi-
tion unfolds, and especially how it affects the behavior of finan-
cial administrators within individual personal bankruptcy cas-
es, will be quite important to the healthy development of this
new regime.
CONCLUSION
Russia is the ninth most populous country in the world, and
the second most populous country with a modern personal
bankruptcy procedure (after the United States).328 If Russia’s
new system functions effectively, it will be a bellwether for oth-
er Eastern European countries (and perhaps China) consider-
ing implementing similar procedures to achieve similar goals.
All indications are that Russia has chosen a structure that re-
flects mainstream European standards and international best
practices. If fears of rampant abuse by opportunistic debtors
are allayed, and administrative capacity concerns are over-
come, the Russian approach will have proven itself worthy of
emulation. In slightly more than two decades, Russia has
emerged from Communism, witnessed the organic and explo-
sive growth of a consumer credit market, and developed a so-
phisticated legal mechanism for treating the inevitable result-
ing rampant individual financial distress. In the face of an oil
market in free fall and a severe contraction in gross domestic
product threatening a national recession,329 this new mecha-
nism could not arrive too soon for Russia’s citizen-debtors.
327. For an extremely revealing discussion of a comparable system in which
competition among trustees arose, see Iain Ramsay, Market Imperatives, Pro-
fessional Discretion and the Role of Intermediaries in Consumer Bankruptcy:
A Comparative Study of the Canadian Trustee in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 399, 423–33 (2000).
328. See Country Comparison: Population, WORLD FACTBOOK (July 2015),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html.
329. See Anna Andrianova, Russian GDP Plunges 4.6%, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
10, 2015, 12:21 PM), http://bloom.bg/1P125Dz.
